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PRESERVE OR PERISH; DESTROY OR DROWNEDISCOVERY MORPHS INTO
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT*

Robert D. Brownstone'
Electronic discovery--including the contents of e-mail
messages and/or the deletion of e-mails-has driven the outcome
of many high-profile cases. We live in a progressivelymore digital
world. Thus, when disputes ripen into litigation, clients, attorneys,
and judges have had to focus increasingly on preserving,
gathering, culling, reviewing, and producing electronic
information. The complexity of information technology (IT) and
the costs of masteringIT have burgeoned. Only some eDiscovery
issues are resolvable by resort to traditionaldiscovery principles.
Consequently, many unique digital issues have infiltratednot only
civil litigation, but also companies' overall records policies,
procedures,andprotocols.

* 0 Robert Douglas Brownstone 2005, 2006. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author and are not necessarily those of Fenwick &
West LLP ("F&W"), of its Electronic Information Management ("EIM") Group,
or of any F&W attorneys or staff members.
' Robert D. Brownstone, Esq., the author of this paper, is the Law &
Technology Director at Fenwick & West LLP. He is a member of four state
bars and of the Information Systems Auditing and Control Association. Mr.
Brownstone is a nationwide speaker and prolific writer on law and technology
issues. In each of his three roles at Fenwick & West, where Mr. Brownstone has
worked since 2000, he has been a combination lawyer and IT leader. Mr.
Brownstone's current responsibilities include advising clients, colleagues, and
co-workers on electronic discovery, on electronic information management, and
on retention/destruction policies and protocols. Prior to joining Fenwick &
West, Robert had a varied thirteen-year career as a litigator, law school
administrator, law school teacher, and consultant. He received his J.D. Magna
Cum Laude from Brooklyn Law School in 1986. Mr. Brownstone's full
biography and contact information are at http://www.fenwick.com/attorneys/
4.2.1.asp?aid=544(last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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ELECTRONIC INFORMATION & EVIDENCE

A. Introduction: DigitalInformation'sPre-Eminence
Electronic discovery 2 has driven the outcome of many recent
high-profile cases. For example, the litigation and settlement of
proceedings involving Merck, Phillip Morris, Adelphia, Arthur
Andersen, Boeing executives, Enron, Frank Quattrone, Martha
Stewart, and Tyco have centered on the content of e-mail
communications and/or the deletion of e-mails.3
Why? Because we live in an increasingly digital world. In the
modern age, less than 1% of business information is being created
exclusively in paper form.4 Thus, upwards of 99% of the world's
information initially existed as a data file.' Though estimates vary,
2A

recent attempt at a formal definition follows:
e-lec-tron-ic dis-cov-er-y[-(n.)] 1. The act or process of providing or
obtaining pertinent information stored on a computer, a computer
network or computer storage devices, usually in a civil action. 2. The
information provided or obtained through the act or process of
electronic discovery.
George Socha, L. Tech. News, No Need for Intimidation (Jan. 2005),
http://www.denniskennedy.com/blog/2005/01/socha and kennedyon_the edis
c.html ("One EDD grande please, de-duped with double metadata and a dash of
OCR. Native only, no conversion today.") (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
3 Alan Murray, Indiscreet E-Mail Claims a Fresh Casualty, WALL ST. J., Mar.
9, 2005, at A2; George Cahlink, Boeing CFO Gets Four-Month Jail Sentence
(Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0205/021805gl.htm; Charles
Pope, Guilty Plea in Boeing Hiring Scandal: Former CFO Likely to Help
Prosecutors, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 16, 2004, http://seattlepi.
nwsource.com/business/199821_searsl6.html; cf ROGER KELLEHER & NANCY
FLYNN,

2004 SURVEY

ON WORKPLACE E-MAIL &

INSTANT

MESSAGING

REVEALS UNMANAGED RISKS, AMER. MGMT. Ass'N (Jul. 13, 2004), http://www.

amanet.org/research/pdfs/IM_2004_Summary.pdf.
4 See PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, How MUCH INFORMATION?

1 (Oct.
30, 2003), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info2003/printable report.pdf [hereinafter LYMAN & VARIAN 2003] (reporting only
0.01% of new information is stored in paper form); cf PETER LYMAN & HAL R.

VARIAN, How MUCH INFORMATION? I (Nov. 10, 2000), http://www2.sims.
berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info/how-much-info.pdf
[hereinafter
LYMAN & VARIAN 2000] (reporting printed documents comprise only 0.003% of
total documents).
5

LYMAN & VARIAN 2003, supra note 4; LYMAN & VARIAN 2000, supra

note 4.
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in most companies, 70% to 95% of information ends up being
stored only in electronic form.'
Accordingly, when disputes ripen into litigation, clients,
attorneys, and judges have had to focus more and more on
preserving, gathering, reviewing, and producing electronic
information. Many eDiscovery issues are resolvable by resort to
traditional discovery principles and strategies. Yet, over the past
few years, some unique electronic information issues-such as
preservation obligations and cost-shifting-have increasingly crept
into civil litigation.
B. Liability Evidence-the Questfor "Smoking Guns"
In general, a requesting party seeks to fulfill the overall
discovery goal of developing evidence to support a claim or
defense. Likewise, a requesting party also pines for the revelation
of the proverbial "smoking gun" e-mail or other electronic files.
As one commentator so aptly pointed out:
Once discovery begins, the chase is on for ... memos admitting
liability, deleted design documents, and other documents never
intended to see the light of day.... It has been proven time and time
again that e-mails are fertile ground for unearthing damaging
documents. Individuals believe them to be private communication.

E-mail authors tend to include candid comments that they
would censor from other forms of communication, either written or

6

"[Seventy percent] of corporate records may be stored in electronic format,

and [thirty percent] of electronic information is never printed to paper." See
BEST PRACTICES,
SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION 4 (July 2005), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?
did=7_05TSP.pdff#page=14 (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); cf WILLIAM A.
FENWICK, ELECTRONIC RECORDS: OPPORTUNITY FOR INCREASED EFFICIENCY,
APPLIED DISCOVERY ORANGE PAGES ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY NEWSL. 4 (June
2003)
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/newsletter/The

OrangePages JunO3 .pdf (estimating that 90% to 95% of corporate documents
are stored only electronically) (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
7 J. Robert Keena, E-Discovery: UnearthingDocuments Byte by Byte, BENCH
& B. MINN., Mar. 2, 2002, at 25, 275, available at http://www2.mnbar.org/
benchandbar/2002/mar02/ediscovery.htm.

4
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oral. Once such comments morph from private to public during
the discovery process, they can have significant impact.'
1. DamagingE-mails
Ironically, in the seminal eDiscovery case of Zubulake I,' a
paper copy of a smoking gun e-mail played a crucial role.
Relatively late in the discovery process, that hardcopy e-mail
message helped convince a court to order the disclosure of the
electronic versions of many additional e-mails.
In that
employment-discrimination and retaliation lawsuit, the plaintiff
had a packrat-like tendency to retain many paper copies of e-mails.
She "produced over 450 pages of relevant e-mails, including
e-mails that would have been responsive to her discovery requests
but were never produced by [the defendant]."o
Thus, in resolving the first of five opinion-generating disputes
in the Zubulake saga, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the
defendant likely possessed additional pertinent e-mails warranting
restoration from back-up tapes. In particular, Zubulake I reasoned
that the plaintiff "ha[d] already produced a sort of 'smoking
gun'-an e-mail suggesting that she would be fired 'ASAP' after
her [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)] charge
was filed, in part so that she would not be eligible for year-end
bonuses.""
Whether or not a plaintiff is a hardcopy hoarder, hope springs
external as to unearthing gold nuggets, egged on by some widely

8 See generally Pierre Chamberland, eDiscovery Advisor, Avoid the E-mail
Litigation Risk (Jan.-Feb. 2006), http://my.advisor.com/Articles.nsf/dp/2CFA200DOE
E5E8DA8825703C007AO42C (subscription required) (last visited Nov. 9, 2006);
Sharon Gaudin, Datamation, Avoiding the Seven Deadly Sins of Email (Mar.
16,
2006),
http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/career/article.php/3592046
(summarizing ERIC M. ROSENBERG, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINs OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS AND How You CAN PROTECT AGAINST THEM (2005),
http://www.re-soft.com/zipfiles/7deadlysins.pdf).
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309, 317
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
0
Id
" Id. at 311.
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publicized examples. 12 For example, a Chevron Corporation
subsidiary was apparently induced to settle a sexual harassment
claim in 1995 for $2.2 million, based on unearthed evidence that
included an e-mail containing such jokes, such as "' [twenty-five]
reasons beer is better than women.""' Similarly, in one of the fenphen diet drug litigations, a plaintiffs computer forensics experts
uncovered a damaging e-mail message, which was ultimately
leaked to the press. The message is universally claimed to have
read: "'Do I have to look forward to spending my waning years
writing checks to fat people with a silly lung problem?"" 4 In many
recent criminal cases, one or more indiscreet e-mails have been
pivotal."

For some "real" (though seemingly apocryphal) examples, see David S.
Bennahum, Daemon Seed: Old Email Never Dies (May 1999), http://www.wired.
com/wired/archive/7.05/email pr.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
13 Ann Cams, Prying Times: Those Bawdy E-Mails Were Goodfor a LaughUntil the Ax Fell, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, at A8 (stating in harassment suits,
"[o]ne or two explicit e-mail messages typically aren't enough ... to prove that
a workplace environment was hostile; [b]ut such e-mails can bolster other
damaging evidence").
14 Keena, supra note 7, at 27; see also Kristin M. Nimsger, Same Game, New
Rules: E-discovery Adds Complexity to Protecting Clients and Disadvantaging
Opponents, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at 2, available at http:/www.
krollontrack.com/Publications/samegame.pdf.
15 See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Quattrone, No. 03 CR.582(RO), 2003
WL 22253325 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (referencing pleadings in that case and
in related Credit Suisse proceedings); Matthew L. Wald, Fraud Is Seen in
Nuclear-Waste Site Study, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A9; Dan Richman,
12

E-mails Sent at Work Anything but Private, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,

Mar. 9, 2005, at Al, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/215147_email09.
html; Matthew Barakat, Former Boeing Executive Gets Four Months in Prison
(Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.detnews.com/2005/business/0502/20/business94555.htm; Alex Berenson, Once Again, Spitzer Follows E-Mail Trail, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2004, at Cl; Thor Valdmanis, Adam Shell, & Elliot Blair Smith,
Marsh & McLennan Accused of Price Fixing, Collusion, USA TODAY, Oct. 15,
2004, at IB, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/insurance/
2004-10-15-spitzer-insurance x.htm; L. Stuart Ditzen, You've Got Evidence,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 11, 2004, at Dl ("[E]-mails sent as casually as water-

cooler chatter never truly die; [t]hey can come back to haunt the senders in court
cases."). See also Catherine Tomasko, Esq., Boeing Pays Record $615 Million
to End Fraud Charges, 20 Gov'T CONT. LITIG. REP., No. 6, July 14, 2006,
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More recently, in one of the Merck product liability cases
based on the Vioxx drug, a pivotal trial exhibit was an e-mail
message stating, "'The possibility of increased C.V. events [like
strokes or heart attacks] is of great concern.. . . I just can't wait to
be the one to present those results to senior management.""'
"'C.V.' was scientific shorthand for cardiovascular problems like
strokes or heart attacks."" That e-mail was written by Dr. Alise
Reicin, a Merck scientist, in 1997, two years before Merck began
selling Vioxx." The ultimate result in that Texas jury trial was a
plaintiffs verdict of $253,500,000.19
Among the many people bitten by the e-mail bug in the court
of public opinion are former Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Secretary Michael Brown,20 and an international
law firm's senior associate ridiculed for an e-mail string in which
he repeatedly asked a secretary to reimburse him four British
pounds (about seven U.S. Dollars) for dry-cleaning expenses
resulting from a lunchtime ketchup spill.
Back in the day, such damaging documents might have
remained undetected because they were buried in a mountain of
boxes of paper. Now, however, automated search and retrieval
methods exist and keep becoming more robust. Consequently,
such smoking gun e-mails have morphed into possibly attainable
brass rings.

http://news.public.findlaw.com/andrews/bf/gov/20060714/
at
available
20060714_boeingsettlement.html.
16 Alex Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won't
Go Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/
18/business/18insure.html?ei=5090&en=d450dd32aecafoa2&ex=1255838400&
partner=rssuserland&pagewanted-print&position=.
7Id.
' Id.

19 Id

See CNN.com, 'Can I Quit Now?' FEMA Chief Wrote as Katrina Raged,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/i 1/03/brown.fema.emails (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).
20
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2. DamagingInternet Use andBlog Postings
In addition to chatrooms, online bulletin boards, and Web
surfing, there is now the "blog," also known as "weblog." A blog
is an often updated Web-based diary that has become the "hottest
phenomenon on the Internet." 2 1 Built on a conversational model,
paradoxically, a blog is often not only intimate, but also
encourages public discussion.2 2
One ramification of employee blogs can be "doocing"namely, the firing of an employee for his or her posting of negative
comments about the company on a personal blog.23
The
ramifications for employers from the content of employee blogs or
from leaks to non-employee blogs include intentional24 or
unintentional 25 disclosure of confidential information, and
vicarious liability for content deemed to be harassing.
As to harassment, even non-sponsored bulletin boards can be
so closely related to the environment and/or so beneficial that they
21 Walter

S. Mossberg, Taking the Mystery Out ofBlog Creation, WALL ST. J.,
June 15, 2005, at D4, available at http://Blog-Article-WSJ-6-15-05.notlong.
com.
22
Id.; Lee Rainie, The State ofBlogging, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,
Jan. 1, 2005, http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP-bloggingdata.pdf; Yuki
Noguchi, Cyber-Catharsis: Bloggers Use Web Sites as Therapy, WASH. POST,
Oct. 12, 2005, at Al, available at http://Blog-Article-WSJ-6-15-05.notlong.com.
23 See Heather Armstrong, About This Site, http://www.dooce.com (coining
the phrase "dooce") (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); see also Joyce Cutler, Beware
Pitfalls Createdby Employee Blogging, PIKE & FISCHER DDEE, May 16, 2005
(citing Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002));
Stephanie Armour, Warning: Your Clever Little Blog Could Get You Fired,
USA TODAY, June 14, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/200506-14-worker-blogs-usat-x.htm.
24 See, e.g., O'Grady v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. App. 6 Dist.
2006) (deciding, unanimously, to strike down subpoenas to Internet "news" sites
seeking source of trade secret information leaked to bloggers), rev'g Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Does, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641 (Cal. Super.
Mar. 11, 2005) (denying motion for protective order where anonymous, fameseeking employees had leaked confidential product information to bloggers).
See also case archive at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Apple-vDoes/ (last
visited Nov. 9, 2006).
25 Michael Hanscom, Eclecticism, Even Microsoft Wants G5s (Oct. 23, 2003),
http://www.michaelhanscom.com/eclecticism/2003/1 0/evenmicrosoft.html.
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are deemed part of the workplace.26 Moreover, employee Websurfing can entail visiting pornographic websites,2 7 not only cutting
into productivity but potentially creating a hostile work
environment.
On the other hand, as to innocent Web-surfing on company
time, the law is still developing. A recent administrative decision
analyzed non-business Internet use for personal needs, such as
checking on weather reports or finding a store location.28 The
ruling deemed such use of the Web for a "non-work-related matter
to be a minor transgression."2 9 The judge deemed the Internet to
be the "modern equivalent of a telephone or a daily newspaper,
providing a combination of communication and information that
most employees use as frequently in their personal lives as for their
work." 0

Blakey v. Cont'1 Airlines, 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000) (holding cyberspace
activity can give rise to workplace discrimination liability; employer obligated
to investigate and redress harassment complaint, lest it be vicariously liable).
27 See The ePolicy Institute, eDisaster Stories, http://www.epolicyinstitute.
com/disaster/stories.html (noting as to firefighters in Columbus, Ohio, "a routine
scan of on-the-job web surfing revealed that the division headquarters' staff
members were visiting as many as 8,000 pornographic sites a day") (last visited
Nov. 9, 2006); see also The ePolicy Institute, Beware Cyberslackers, Spammers,
http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/i policies/index.html (noting "90% of workers
admit to recreational surfing on company time, accounting for nearly one third
of their online activity;" and "[c]yberslackers' favorite sites [were] general news
29.1%; investment 22.5%; [and] pornography 9.7%") (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
28 Dep't of Educ. v. Choudhri, OATH Index No. 722/06 (N.Y.C. Off. of
Admin. Trials & Hearings), Mar. 9, 2006, http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/nyc/doechoudri309O6opn.pdf
(mitigating
insubordination
punishment where employee: (1) only surfed after completing all of his work
and was awaiting more work; and (2) never neglected a work assignment).
29 Id. (emphasis added) (finding selective "prohibit[ion on one employee's]
using the internet for any personal reasons was unusually harsh and arbitrary,
motivated by anger rather than a concern for office productivity").
30
Id. at 12.
26
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3. DamagingMetadata and Embedded Data
As discussed in Section III(D) infra, metadata is "data about
data." File system metadata "describes when a file was created,
where it was stored, and what programs the computer uses to help
access the file."' More significantly, an electronic file-especially
if disseminated as an e-mail attachment-may contain embedded
data, i.e., evidence of prior revisions that could come back to haunt
the sender.3 2
There are concerns that embedded data may be hidden in
documents drafted by counsel on one side," or counsel on both
sides (such as settlement agreements34 and/or stipulations).
Significantly, a recipient can manipulate a file to "peel back the
Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., No. 05 C 3003, slip op. at 2006 WL
1308629 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (entering default judgment for breach of noncompete against a former employee based on metadata showing the employee
had deleted and altered thousands of files during delay to produce companyprovided laptop, enforced Krumweide v. Brighton Assoc., L.L.C., No. 05C3003,
2006 WL 2349985 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2006)).
32 See, e.g., David H. Schultz, Defining Metadata; Counsel's Duty to Preserve
and Produce Brought Forefront In Recent Case, LAW JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS
EDISCOVERY LAW & STRATEGY, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.ljnonline.com/pub/
ljnediscovery/2_7/news/145513-1.html (subscription required); Gail Cookson,
Lawyer Opportunity: What is Metadata Anyway? (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.
pglewis.com/newsletter/Nov05/Nov2005RecentDecisions.html.
33 Stephen Shankland, Hidden text shows SCO prepped lawsuit against BofA
(Mar. 18, 2004), http://news.com.com/2102-7344_3-5170073.html?tag=st.util.
print (last visited on Nov. 9, 2006).
34 ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 ("[I]f
the embedded information is on a subject such as her client's willingness to
settle at a particular price, then there might be no way to 'pull back' that
information."); NYC Ass'n B. Comm. Prof. Jud. Eth., Formal Op. 2003-04,
2004 WL 837937, http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2003.html (finding, in some
instances, lawyers "will have learned confidential information that cannot
simply be erased from memory" and it would be unrealistic to expect the lawyer
to forget it, e.g., when he or she "receives a one-page fax [that could have been a
Word file with embedded data] saying, 'Offer $100,000, but you have authority
to settle for up to $300,000"'). In addition, consider the situation where a first
draft of an agreement is the result of undoing edits to the final agreement from a
prior transaction. That final agreement was likely the result of a compromise
reached via negotiation. Thus, at the start of the later transaction, the sender will
not wish to share with opposing counsel any revisions that would reveal
concessions made in the prior transaction.
31

10
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layers" to see prior iterations of a file's contents or use a tool to
extract metadata in searchable form. There are heightened
confidentiality concerns for attorneys who, like other drafters,
often use "File/Save As" to adapt a file created for one client to a
second client's needs."
Yet all computer users are subject to the nuances of word
processing and spreadsheet files.36 In the last year alone, those
bitten by the metadata bug include high level individuals at the
Pentagon, the British Prime Minister's office, the United Nations,
the Democratic National Committee and the California Attorney
General's office."
Beyond the scope of this paper is a discussion of the range of
views espoused by bar associations and courts as to the obligations
of a recipient of inadvertently disclosed metadata." Suffice it to
35 "[Ninety percent] of documents in circulation began as something else."
Shankland, supra note 33.
36 See, e.g., Diane Karpman, Metadata Can Bite You Where It Hurts,
Lawwise, CAL. BAR J., Nov. 1, 2005, at 20, available at http://Metadata-CalBJ-l l-105.notlong.com; COMMENTARY, DANGERS OF DOCUMENT METADATA,
WORKSHARE (2004), http://www.workshare.com/collateral/misc/Dangers of
DocumentMetadata.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
37 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, AT&T Leaks Sensitive Info in NSA Suit
(May 30, 2006), http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-6077353.html?tag-st.util.
print; Brian Bergstein, Cos., Gov't Seek to Keep Lid on Metadata (Feb. 3,
2006),
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2006/02/03/cos
Dennis Kennedy, Evan
govt seek to keeplid on metadata/?page=full;

Schaeffer, & Tom Mighell, Thinking eDiscovery:

Mining the Value from

Metadata (Jan. 2006), http://www.discoveryresources.org/04_om thinkingED
0601.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Tom Zeller Jr., Beware Your Trail of
Digital Fingerprints, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, http://Metadata-NYT-11-705.notlong. com.
3 This murky area has evolved in part from various opinions as to misdirected
faxes reaching unintended recipients. See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc.,
82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (1999) (stating unintended recipient of confidential
material must notify sender; but, absent a court order, the recipient is not
required to return or destroy the material); ABA Comm. On Ethics And Prof 1
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (stating no "specific prohibition
against a lawyer's reviewing and using embedded information in electronic
documents, whether received from opposing counsel, an adverse party, or an
agent of an adverse party"); N.Y. St. B.A. Ethics, Op. 782 (2004) (stating, under
DR 4-101, sender has duty "to use reasonable care when transmitting documents
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say, though, that once confidential information gets to an
adversary, he or she will remember the content, independent of
whether the misdirected information ends up being returned to the
sender.
For further discussion regarding metadata in client-created
files, refer to Section III(D)(4), infra, about recent litigation
developments on the obligation to produce electronic files with the
metadata intact.
II. ELECTRONIC PRODUCTION RESPONSIBILITY

A. Modern Scope of Discovery
Broad discovery remains paramount in civil litigation such
that, in the litigation context, the transition to a predominantly
electronic mode has been accelerating at a rapid pace.3 9 Black
letter case law now universally supports the assertion that
electronic information is as susceptible to discovery rules and
principles as paper. 40 The recent changes to the Federal Rules of
by e-mail to prevent the disclosure of metadata containing client confidences or
secrets"); N.Y. St. B.A. Ethics, Op. 749 (2001) (stating that, ethically, lawyers
may not use software to extract information regarding drafting history of
adversary's e-mail attachments). N.Y.C. Ass'n. B. Comm. Prof. Jud. Eth., supra
note 34 (considering use of inadvertently disclosed information to be an ethical
violation would unfairly penalize innocent attorney and client for error of
another).
3 See generally Robert D. Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the
Stormy eDiscovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, IM 6-7 & nn.13-21 (2004),
availableat http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vlOi5/article53.pdf#page=3.
40 See generally Lisa M. Arent, Robert D. Brownstone, & William A.
Fenwick, Preserving, Requesting and Producing Electronic Information, 19
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 131 (Dec. 2002), as revised (June

12, 2003) § II(A)(1), at 2-4, § III(A)(3)(b), at 40-41, available at
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/Litigation/ediscovery.pdf (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a), defining the term "document" broadly to include
information in any tangible format). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), cited in
Kucala Enters. v. Auto Wax Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833 (N.D. Ill. May
27, 2003), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5723 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 6, 2004) (dismissing with prejudice based in part on eleventh hour deletion
of 12,000 files); cf Jones v. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707 (S.D.N.Y. May
16, 2002) ("Broad discovery is a cornerstone of the litigation process;" practical

12
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Civil Procedure codified that view by adding the phrase
"electronically stored information" to Rule 34's title and to
numerous of its sub-sections. 41 Similar provisions are now
components of some state procedural rules and some federal court
local rules.4 2
concerns kept judge from ordering production of "data in electronic,
manipulable form [to] facilitate expert analysis.").
41 See AMENDMENTS TO THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, at 29-33
[hereinafter
FRCP
EDISCOVERY
AMENDMENTS],
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscoverywNotes.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2006). See also ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., at 28, passim (July 25, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf#page=30
[hereinafter
REPORT]. A series of eDiscovery-related proposed amendments were published
for comment in May 2004 and re-published, as revised, in August 2004. The
comment period closed in February 2005. Culminating a multi-year process, the
proposed changes were approved by the United States Supreme Court on April
12, 2006. See Patrick E. Premo, Robert D. Brownstone, & Anthony P. Dykes,
Electronic Discovery is Focus of Pending Federal Rule Changes (Fenwick &
West LLP Litigation Alert Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/
Publications/Litigation/Litigation Alert 04-25-06.pdf. Then, when Congress
took no pertinent action, these rules took effect on December 1, 2006. See
generally Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Federal Rulemaking,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/congress0406.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
See Ken Withers, Electronic Discovery Rules, Proposed Rules, Commentary,
and Debate, http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/index.html (discussing the
history of the development of these proposals) (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Pike
& Fischer DDEE, The Future of E-discovery, May 27, 2005 (subscription
required); Key JudicialPanelApproves New Civil Rules for HandlingElectronic
Data in Litigation, P&F ILR WEEKLY ALERT, Apr. 20, 2005,
http://internetlaw.pf.com/; Gwendolyn Mariano, EDD Rules: The Great Debate
(Apr. 18, 2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1113469509165; ADAM
I. COHEN, UNDERSTANDING THE PROPOSED FRCP AMENDMENTS (Apr. 19,
2005), http://www.fiosinc.com/events/pdfFiles/FRCPamendments_041905.pdf.
See also Brenda Sandburg, E-Confusion Reigns, S.F. RECORDER, May 23, 2005,
http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLTN.jsp?id=
1116851712954 (assessing landscape of preservation obligations, eDiscovery
review costs, and proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
42 For summaries of and links to such rules, see Applied Discovery, Court
Rules, http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawLibrary/courtRules.asp
(last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Kroll Ontrack, Rules and Statutes by Location,
http://www.krollontrack.com/legalresources/rules.aspx (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).
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B. Overview of Key Categories of Producible Electronic
Information
In contemplating the scope of discovery, employers are now
faced with the same challenges as are other modem day litigants.
Employers must account for information stored in electronic form
and consider the most effective and efficient means of accessing
various types of such information. Hard drives, back-up tapes,
storage devices, web server logs, databases, and "deleted"4 3 files
are among the many formats and environments that often need to
be navigated."
The best judicial description of the world of electronic
information was propounded in 2003 by Southern District of New
York Judge Shira A. Scheindlin. Judge Scheindlin promulgated a
two-part framework in the first of her several landmark electronic
discovery decisions in an employment discrimination case,
Zubulake I.45 As its threshold issue in assessing the plaintiffs

43 The continued existence on hard drives of one or more ostensibly "deleted"
files can haunt many a litigant. The reason is, especially in the Windows
operating system, "deleted" does not necessarily mean gone forever. See
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Craig Ball, L. Tech.
News, Can Your Old Files Come Back to Life? (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.law.
com/special/supplement/e discovery/old files.shtml;
TOM
COUGHLIN,

COUGHLIN ASSOCIATES, RUMORS OF MY ERASURE ARE PREMATURE (2003),

http://www.tomcoughlin.com/Techpapers/Rumorsofiyerasure,%20061803.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2006); James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the DELETE
Key, 3 THE GREEN BAG 2D 393, 393-95 (Summer, 2000), available at
http://www.greenbag.org/rosenbaum-deletekey.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
44 "The broad definition of 'documents' typically used in requests for
production encompasses information stored on computers and on computer
media, such as floppy disks, zip drives, jaz drives, and archival or emergency
storage devices (such as back-up tapes)." Arent, Brownstone, & Fenwick, supra
note 40, § II(A)(1), at 3. See also R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd., 89
Cal. Rptr. 2d 353, 355-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding 'document' . . .
included computer tapes, discs and any information stored in a computer");
Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 11 MASS. L. RPTR. 203 (1999) No. 97-2307, Mass.
Super. LEXIS 240, at *16 (June 15, 1999) (agreeing with the plaintiff that
"documents," as defined in preservation order and in document requests,
encompassed data contained on back-up tapes).
45 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (establishing a sevenfactor test, under which some cost-shifting could be appropriate as to restoration
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motion to compel production and allocation of consequential costs,
Zubulake I divided the world of electronic information into two
distinct broad categories:
1. "[D]ata that is kept in an accessible format," broken
down into three sub-categories, "listed in order from
most accessible to least accessible:"
a. "Active, online data," such as hard drives;
b. "Near-line data," such as optical disks; and
c. "Offline storage/archives . . . [which] lack[] 'the

of an intelligent disk

coordinated

control

subsystem,'

. . . in the lingo, JBOD ('Just a

Bunch of Disks')."46
2. "Electronic data [that] is relatively inaccessible,"
broken down into two sub-categories, also ranked in
order of accessibility:
a. "Backup tapes;" and
b. "Erased, fragmented or damaged data."47
For the first category, accessible data, Zubulake I followed the
traditional approach of having the responding party bear all costs.48
For the second category, relatively inaccessible data, following
application of a seven-factor test, some cost-shifting to the
requesting party could be appropriate but only if the marginal
utility of restoring such data is evinced by a "fact-intensive"
review of results of "small sample" restoration.4 9
The newly amended Rule 26(b)(2)(B) provides that, once the
responding party shows undue burden, electronic information that

of inaccessible data only if the marginal utility thereof is evinced by a "factintensive"
review of results of "small sample" restoration).
46
Id. at 318-20 (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
48
1d. at 324.
49 Id. Restoration of data from back-up tapes is very costly because such tapes
take an indiscriminate snapshot of data without preserving a directory. McPeek
v. Ashcroft (McPeek 1), 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001); Ian Austen, Storage
Methods Come and Go, But Tape Holds Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at
G8.
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is "not reasonably accessible" need not be produced unless a court
so orders on a showing of "good cause.""o
The Zubulake I accessible/inaccessible divide is a construct for
coping with the all-important civil discovery issue of spiraling
costs. As discussed in more detail in Section III(B), infra,
Zubulake I and the related follow-up decision in Zubulake IIP' laid
the groundwork for the potential future development of an overall
multi-step eDiscovery process that is not only cost-sensitive but
also conceptually sound and pragmatic.
C. Preservationand its Flip-Side, Spoliation
Modem-day judges treat with utmost seriousness the duty to
preserve potentially relevant electronic information and paper
documents. Once a dispute merely ripens to the point where
litigation is "reasonably anticipated," there is a "duty to suspend
any routine document purging system ... and to put in place a

litigation hold to ensure the preservation of relevant documentsfailure to do so constitutes spoliation."5 2

FRCP EDISCOVERY AMENDMENTS, supra note 41, at 6-7.
5' Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake Ill), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
52 Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 280,
288 (E.D.
Va. 2004) (enforcing "litigation hold" by granting motion to compel production
of documents and testimony relating to Plaintiff Rambus's document retention,
collection, production, and "Shred Days"). On March 1, 2005, the court orally
granted Defendant Infineon's motion to dismiss Rambus's patent infringement
claims based on Rambus's spoliation. Less than three weeks later, before a
written decision could issue, the parties settled the five-year old litigation. See
Tom Krazit, Rambus, Infineon End DRAM Dispute, Sign Licensing Deal, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 21, 2005. But see Rambus v. Hynix, No. C-00-20905
RMW, 2006 WL 565893 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (stating unclean hands defense
failed because Rambus had not targeted "any specific document or category of
relevant documents with the intent to prevent production in a lawsuit such as
th[is] one"). See also Brenda Sandburg, E-Confusion Reigns, S.F. RECORDER,
May 23, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLTN.jsp?id=
1116851712954 (assessing landscape of preservation obligations, eDiscovery
review costs and proposed FRCP amendments). Cf Samsung Elecs. Co. v.
Rambus, 439 F. Supp. 2d 524, 569 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding spoliation based on
preservation duty having arisen upon Rambus's hiring of outside counsel and
50
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Once the heightened duty kicks in, the "[d]estruction of
evidence raises [a] presumption that disclosure of the materials
would be damaging."" Thus, on top of potential criminal law and
ethical violations,"4 the litigation ramifications for spoliation can
adoption of licensing program that had made patent litigation a "foregone
conclusion").
5 Arista Records v. Sakfield Holding, 314 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2004)
(finding that the defendant's destruction of electronic information precluded the
defendant from attacking the plaintiffs analysis of existing electronic
information, while denying the defendant's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds).
54 See generally Arent, Brownstone, & Fenwick, supra note 40, § II(A), at
2-13, available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/Litigation/
ediscovery.pdf#page=16 (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST
PRACTICE GUIDELINES &

COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING

INFORMATION

&

RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE (Sept. 2005) http://www.thesedonaconf

erence.org/dltForm?did=TSG9_05.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). For Sedona
Guidelines highlights, see SEDONA GUIDELINES, COMMENT 1.B, http://www.the

sedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSG9 05.pdf#page=25
("Defensible
policies need not be universal, nor do they need to address the retention of all
information.") (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); SEDONA GUIDELINES, GUIDELINE 5,

http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSG9 05.pdf#page=5 ("An
organization's policies . . . must mandate the suspension of ordinary destruction
... to comply with preservation obligations related to actual or reasonably
anticipated litigation, governmental investigation or audit.") (last visited Nov. 9,
2006); SEDONA GUIDELINES, COMMENT 5.H, http://www.thesedonaconference.

org/dltForm?did=TSG9_05.pdf#page=59 ("If an organization takes reasonable
steps to implement a legal hold, it should not be held responsible for ... an
individual acting outside the scope of authority and/or ... inconsistent with the
legal hold.") (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); SEDONA GUIDELINES, NOTES ON
COMMENT 5.H, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSG9_05.
pdf#page=60 ("The recognition . . . of a 'safe harbor' against culpability in such
circumstances is essential[; a]s is abundantly clear from the body of this
document, the nature and volume of electronic documents is such that there is no
possibility that any preservation system can be perfect.") (last visited Nov. 9,
2006). See also Jason Velasco, ProactivePreservationMgmt. Best Practices:
Findings and Best Practicesfrom 2002-2004, RENEWDATA, Mar. 28, 2005;
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS & LORI J. ASHLEY, 2005 ELECTRONIC RECORDS
MANAGEMENT SURVEY; A RENEWED CALL To ACTION, COHASSET ASSOCS.

(2005), http://www.merresource.com/pdf/survey2005.pdf; In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 445 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that, in a criminal case,
based on an indication that the client likely obstructed justice by deleting emails, the crime-fraud exception warranted compelled production of evidence of
attorney-client communication).
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include: monetary penalties (such as attorney fees, costs, and/or
pay-for-proof sanctions);" exclusion of evidence; delay of the start
of trial; mistrial; adverse inference jury instructions;6 and, in an
extreme case, a dismissal or judgment on the merits."

5 Some exemplary orders include Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
224 F.R.D. 595 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2004) (awarding $566,838 for destruction of
e-mails in patent infringement case), aff'd by and appeal denied, 348 F. Supp.
2d 332 (D.N.J. 2004); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13580 (D.D.C. July 21, 2004) (awarding $2.75M spoliation fine plus
costs associated with discovery dispute); Advantacare Health Partners, LP v.
Access IV, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004) (awarding
evidentiary and monetary sanctions against former employees who participated
in setting up a competing company and intentionally destroyed electronic
information in contravention of TRO); Network Computing Services Corp. v.
Cisco Systems, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392 (D.S.C. 2004) (awarding monetary
sanctions supplemented by adverse instruction).
56 See, e.g., Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. 15th Cir. Mar. 1, 2005)
(granting instruction request based on the defendant's repeated knowing failures
to produce e-mails and pattern of deliberate misrepresentations to court),
discussed in Section III(A)(4) infra; United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13580 (D.D.C. July 21, 2004) (granting instruction
based on the defendant's "reckless disregard and gross indifference" to e-mail
preservation obligations); Network Computing Services Corp. v. Cisco Systems,
Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 401 (D.S.C. 2004) (agreeing to instruct jury that it could
consider the plaintiff s disingenuous repeated representations to court that it was
certain that some ultimately produced and "garden variety" electronic files did
not exist); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 94
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1, 85 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 41,728 (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2004); Trigon, Inc. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(finding Government's retained litigation consulting company willfully and
intentionally destroyed testifying experts' draft reports and correspondence in
corporate taxpayer's refund action, warranting adverse inferences and other
sanctions); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(finding, at bench trial, "[D]efendants' spoliation of evidence on their computer
support[ed] negative inference that [D]efendants destroyed evidence of
misappropriation" of trade secrets; "highly suspicious" deletions and
defragmentation were "circumstantial evidence" of misappropriation), mot. for
new trial denied, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7974 (May 2, 2002); cf Med. Lab
Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming refusal
to give adverse instruction, but acknowledging that trial court's "inherent
discretionary power to make appropriate evidentiary rulings in response to the
destruction or spoliation of relevant evidence .. . includes the power to sanction
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A court can deem a litigant's lack of compliance

with

preservation, collection, or production responsibilities to be an
inappropriate, intentional, or negligent destruction of evidence, i.e.,
spoliation. The current trend is to sanction even unintentional-butnegligent destruction or untimely productions. The requisite
"culpable state of mind"" is, in some federal circuits, surprisingly
low. In 2002, the Second Circuit found that "discovery sanctions,
including an adverse inference instruction, may be imposed where
a party has breached a discovery obligation not only through bad
faith or gross negligence, but also through ordinary negligence."5 9
On the other side of the coin, courts in other circuits have been
more lenient.60 Additionally, the recent Andersen6' and Quattrone6 2
the responsible party by instructing the jury that it may infer that the spoiled or
destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the responsible party").
5
See, e.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL
1308629, *4 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (entering default judgment for breach of
non-compete agreement against ex-employee who had deleted and altered
thousands of files during delay to produce laptop); Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local
100 Hotel Empl. & Rest. Empl. Int'l Union (MetOpera), 212 F.R.D. 178
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting the plaintiffs motion for judgment against labor
union), adhered to on reconsiderationby, 175 L.R.R.M. 2870 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
27, 2004). See also Coleman (Parent) Holdings v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No.
CA 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. 15th Cir. Mar. 23, 2005) (partial default
judgment).
58 Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107, 113
(2d Cir. 2002) (vacating jury verdict and remanding for reconsideration of
whether the plaintiffs failure to timely or fully produce e-mail back-up tapes
warranted adverse inference).
59
Id. at 101.
60 See, e.g., Advantacare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16835, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004) (finding original entry of default
judgment too severe but still granting evidentiary and monetary sanctions in the
amount of $20,000 against former employees); MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v.
Moulton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11376, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004)
(finding that permissive trademark dilution inference could be raised, but the
defendants' lack of bad faith and failure to alter normal document retention
practices did not warrant conclusive dilution determination); cf Jones v. Boeing
Co., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18105, *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 26, 2004) (finding that
adverse inference instruction was not warranted in sex discrimination case due
to lack of showing that the defendant intentionally destroyed hardcopy
documents to suppress the truth or that there had been resulting prejudice); see
generally Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery

FALL 2006]

eDiscovery & Electronic Info. Mgmt.

19

reversals, albeit in the criminal context, may have an impact on the
civil culpability standard.3
In the civil employment litigation setting, a Southern District of
New York judge went even farther than an adverse instruction in
Metropolitan Opera Association v. Local 100 Hotel Employees'
("MetOpera"). The misconduct was so extreme that the judge
granted the plaintiffs motion for "final judgment as to liability
against [the] defendants and for ... attorneys fees necessitated by

the discovery abuse[s] by [the] defendants and their counsel."65 As
a basis for the lawsuit's ultimate "result [being] driven by
discovery abuse" rather than by resolution "on the merits,"
MetOpera relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 37,
28 U.S.C. § 1927, as well as the court's inherent power to
sanction.66
Sanctions in the Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
71 (2004) (surveying spoliation sanctions decisions, and concluding that calls to
incorporate a safe harbor provision into Rule 37 as a basis for sanctions are
unnecessary as courts have taken a balanced approach to sanctions).
61 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005) (reversing
obstruction of justice conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(2)(A)-(B)
"because the jury instructions ... failed to convey the requisite consciousness of
wrongdoing").
62 United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 180 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the defendant's lack of knowledge of the specific focus of the investigation was
erroneously not told to the jury).
63 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005) (reversing
obstruction of justice conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(2)(A)-(B)
"because the jury instructions . . . failed to convey the requisite consciousness of
wrongdoing"); see also United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 180 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that defendant's lack of knowledge of the specific focus of the
investigation was erroneously not told to the jury).
64 Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100 Hotel Employees (MetOpera), 212 F.R.D.
178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), adhered to on reconsiderationby and clarified by, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17093, 175 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2870 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004).
65 MetOpera, 212 F.R.D. at 231 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 181, 230. Court
held:
The discovery process in this case ... transcended the usual clashes
between adversaries, sharp elbows, spitballs and even Rambo litigation
tactics. This case was qualitatively different. It presented the
unfortunate combination of lawyers who completely abdicated their
responsibilities under the discovery rules and as officers of the court
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D. What To Do: Retention/DestructionPolicies
It is advisable for every client to adopt a formal, written
retention (i.e., destruction) policy and concomitant implementation
protocols. An effective regime can help shield the company from
negative inferences or defaults due to deletion or other disposition
of information. To be effective, a retention and destruction process
must: (1) include an adequate suspension ("litigation hold")
provision,"7 and (2) not have been instituted or followed in bad
faith (i.e., suddenly followed to limit damaging evidence available
to potential litigation adversaries)."

An effective litigation hold stops any and all purging of
potentially relevant information upon reasonable anticipation of
legal dispute. Thus, before implementing or changing a retention
and destruction regime, a company should segregate and collect all
electronic information (and paper) pertinent to all currently
pending and reasonably anticipated disputes. In trying to assess
whether a potential dispute is likely to develop into an actual

and clients who lied and, through omission and commission, failed to
search for and produce documents and, indeed, destroyed evidenceall to the ultimate prejudice of the truth-seeking process.
Id.

See infra Section III(A)(2)-(3).
See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Techs. AG, Inc., 222 F.R.D.
280, 298-99 (E.D. Va. 2004) (granting motion to compel production of
documents and testimony relating to Plaintiff Rambus's document retention,
collection, production, and "Shred Days," and finally dismissing case based on
spoliation); see also Rambus v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., No. C-00-20905
RMW, 2006 WL 565893, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (finding that the
unclean hands defense failed because Rambus had not "targeted any specific
document or category of relevant documents with the intent to prevent
production in a lawsuit such as th[is] one"). In Hynix, a planned "licensing"
campaign was viewed as one that would "probably push [Ramb]us into litigation
quickly." Id. at *5. Thus, Rambus adopted a retention and destruction policy in
part to be "battle ready." Id. (finding that, although the plaintiff started to
recycle back-up tapes every three months, as well as to discard all drafts of all
documents, it kept documents relating to patent disclosures and proof of
invention). Cf Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, 439 F. Supp. 2d 524, 568 (E.D.
Va. 2006) (finding spoliation based on "bad faith" adoption of "retention" policy
in order to "prepar[e] for the coming litigation").
67
68
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litigation, proceeding, or investigation, the company might
consider the frequency and scope of similar past disputes.
The company should divide its information into two categories;
setting aside those items needing retention based on legal and/or
business requirements from everything else. Whether or not
litigation is pending, Information Technology leaders, legal
leaders, and corporate officers need to communicate frequently to
identify and map all storage locations and formats, including
shared network drives, intranets, and back-up tapes.
Wherever possible, retention/destruction policies and protocols
should reject printing to paper, and enable central storage rather
than encourage local storage. However, each company's culture is
unique, thus, a realistic, tailored approach is needed. Consistency
in applying policies and protocols, commissioning outside audits,
periodic training and quality control tests are advisable.
The goal is to walk the tightrope between saving too much and
destroying too much. The end game is to have a defensible
process in place in the event of a spoliation motion in a future
litigation. In today's environment of huge data storage capacity,
some business reasons for declining to retain all electronic
information include improved retrieval capability, avoiding
excessive storage costs, and streamlining operations and project
transitions.
Although it is not an argument likely to wind up in a formal
response to a motion to compel or a motion for sanctions, there is
an elephant in the room. If one's metaphorical house is "not in
order," response times and costs can be overwhelming for the
collection, review, and production needed to answer a government
inquiry or litigation discovery request.
E. SpiralingeDiscovery Costs
The need for cost-sensitivity is great because the expenses
associated with vast data sets of electronic information can be
astronomical.
One survey estimated the aggregate costs of
preserving, collecting and producing commercial litigation in the
United States has grown to almost $1.8 billion in 2006, and will
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expand to more than $3.1 billion by 2008.69 The reasons some
firms handle as much eDiscovery activity in-house as possible are
cost sensitivity and quality control."o
III. "IN THE TRENCHES ISSUES" ARISING OUT OF PLAN AND
PRESERVE, COLLECT, F.I.N.D., REVIEW, AND PRODUCE

The eDiscovery process is comprised of five steps: (1) plan
(and preserve); (2) collect; (3) F.I.N.D. (File Identification
Narrowed by Definition)-also known as "culling" or
"winnowing"; (4) review; and (5) produce. As to issues arising
under each of those five steps, the law is in flux. However, one
thing is certain: in modem-day litigation, eDiscovery has become
a pivotal issue. Hot topics in eDiscovery include: preservation
and retention obligations; collection of evidence, including
assessing cost allocation; litigation strategies, including potential
collaboration as to search criteria during the winnowing process;
form of review and production; and doing the utmost to avoid
inadvertent disclosure that waives either privilege or work product
protection.

George J. Socha & Tom Gelbmann, The 2006 Socha-Gelbmann Electronic
Discovery Survey Results, http://www.sochaconsulting.com/2006surveyresults.
htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
70 See Peter Darling, Seeking Out New Markets: Tapping Into Client Trends
for New Business and Bigger Profits, A.B.A. L. PRAC. MAG. (Sept. 2006),
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/EIM/20060901 _Law Practice.
pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). See also Richard E. Davis, In-House EDD:
Pot of Gold or Can of Worms?, EDISCOVERY LAW & STRATEGY, at 5 (Nov. 3,
http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLTNjsp?id=
2004),
1099217123685 ("For firms with in-house e-discovery processing capability,
benefits include greater consistency of document-production methodology and
better cost control.").
69
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A. Plan, Preserve-CaseStudies in Lack of Compliance
1. MetOpera: PlaintiffUnion's Deficiencies Enumerated
In MetOpera, the plaintiffs and their counsel exhibited a lack
of good faith regarding the discovery process." Among the litany
of bad acts warranting the supreme sanction of entry of judgment
were:
In response to [Plaintiff] Met[Opera's] counsel's continuing assertions
of lack of an adequate document search and demonstrations of nonproduction, the [Defendant] Union's counsel repeatedly represented to
the Court that all ...

[responsive] documents ... had been produced

when ... a thorough search had never been made and counsel had no
basis for so representing;
counsel knew the Union's files were in disarray and that it had no
document retention policy but failed to cause a retention policy to be
adopted to prevent destruction of responsive documents, both paper and
electronic;
counsel failed to explain to the non-lawyer in charge of document
production ... that a document included a draft or other non-identical
copy and included documents in electronic form;
the non-lawyer the Union put in charge of document production failed
to speak to all . . . who might have relevant documents, never followed

up with the people [to whom] he did speak. . . and failed to contact all
of the Union's internet service providers ('ISPs') to attempt to retrieve
deleted e-mails as counsel represented to the Court that [the nonlawyer] would;
no lawyer ever doubled back to inquire of the Union employee in
charge of document production whether he conducted a search and
what steps he took to assure complete production; [and]
in the face of Met counsel's constant assertions that no adequate
document search had been conducted and responsive documents had
not been produced, Union counsel failed to inquire of several important
witnesses about documents until the night before their depositions.72

7' MetOpera, 212 F.R.D. 178, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (regarding lying to the
court about a court-ordered deposition witness' vacation schedule, finding
"counsel's conduct was not 'merely discourteous' but rather a breach of their
responsibility to opposing counsel and the Court, inter alia, to engage in
discovery in good faith, comply with court orders and, more fundamentally, to
tell the truth").
72
Id. at 181-82.
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The list of bad faith acts in MetOpera serves as a veritable
guidebook on the notification aspects of the preservation,
collection, and production obligations.
2. Zubulake V. Expansion of Corporate Counsel's Obligations
Since the summer of 2004, under the new regime ushered in by
Zubulake V,73 notice of an employee dispute triggers significant
and expanded legal obligations. A company and its counsel must
take all reasonable steps to locate and preserve all relevant
electronic and hardcopy information.7 4 Outside counsel and
in-house counsel are responsible for coordinating and overseeing
the preservation and production process" by: (1) instituting
immediately, and periodically re-issuing," a litigation hold on
deletion or destruction of information; (2) communicating
immediately and directly with all key players, i.e., those
individuals identified in a party's initial and supplemental
disclosures;" and (3) safeguarding all pertinent electronic
archival/back-up media."
In Zubulake, some key employees had deleted relevant e-mails
after being instructed by in-house counsel to retain them." In
addition, some relevant e-mails stored on an active server had been
produced only after thirteen depositions (and four re-depositions).o
73 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake P), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
74

7

Id. at 432-33.

1Id. at

435.

76 Id. at 433 ("[T]he litigation hold should be periodically re-issued so that

[(1)] new employees are aware of it, and [(2)] so that it is fresh in the minds of
all employees.").
77
Id. at 433-34. As of December 1, 2006, under newly amended Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(1)(B) entitled "Initial Disclosures," "a party must, without awaiting a
discovery request, provide: a copy of, or a description by category and location
of, all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that are
in the possession, custody, or control of the party and that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B), at 4-5,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscoverywNotes.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2006)
" Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 439.
79 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
o Id. at 429.
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Moreover, some backup tapes had been lost after a specific
preservation directive had been issued."' Finally, counsel had not
issued "litigation hold" instructions to a senior Human Resources
staffer intimately involved with the plaintiff s termination.8 2
The court imposed sanctions for willful spoliation, including an
adverse inference instruction as to deleted and lost e-mailse-with
the imposition of the costs of re-depositions required by tardy
productions84 -as well as the costs of additional restoration" and
of the sanctions motion." Not surprisingly, eight months later, the
jury awarded Plaintiff Laura Zubulake $29.2 million in damages."
3. Broccoli v. EchoStar: "LitigationHold" Failings
The case of Broccoli v. Echostar Communications illustrated
the point that one cannot blindly follow a retention policy and be
protected from potential legal ramifications." In that case, the
employer had an "extraordinary" and "risky" retention,
destruction, and purging policy.89 First, unsorted e-mails were
auto-purged every twenty-one days and not retained anywhere.
"Sent Items" over seven days old were automatically migrated to
"Deleted Items," and then "Deleted Items" over fourteen days old
were purged.90 Second, an employee's folders of electronic files
and e-mails were deleted thirty days after he or she left the
company."

8

Id. at 427.

8
84

Id. at 440.
id.

81

Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

87

Eduardo Porter, UBS Orderedto Pay $29 Million in Sex Bias Lawsuit, N.Y.

82 Id. at 424.

86 Id. at 437.

TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C3.

Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns. Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005).
RQId. at 510.
90 Id. (finding "Sent Items" over seven days old were automatically migrated
to "Deleted Items," and then "Deleted Items" over fourteen days old were
completely purged).
' Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
88
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The court quoted Arthur Andersen v. United States92 to assess a
post-trial sanctions motion and explain its prior adverse inference
jury instruction:
'Document retention policies,' which are created in part to keep certain
information from getting into the hands of others, including the
Government, are common in business ....

It is not wrongful for a

manager ... to instruct its employees to com ly with a valid document
retention policy under normal circumstances.

The Echostar court then found that, "[u]nder normal
circumstances, [a twenty-one-day purge] policy may be a risky but
arguably defensible business practice undeserving of sanctions."9 4
Yet, the employer had not satisfied its Zubulake V "litigation hold"
obligation:
Echostar plainly had a duty to preserve employment and termination
documents when its management learned of [the plaintiffs] potential
Title VII claim ....
... [Yet] none of the [e-mails] exchanged between [the plaintiff], [his]
supervisors, and Echostar's upper management regarding his
complaints . . . were preserved.

Moreover, Echostar admits that it

never issued a company-wide instruction regarding the suspension of
any data destruction policy ....
Given Echostar's status as a large public corporation with ample
financial resources and personnel management know-how, the court
finds it indefensible that such basic personnel procedures and related
95
documentation were lacking.

The court thus sanctioned the defendant for "gross spoliation"

and "bad faith." 96
4. Other Anti-Spoliation CautionaryTales
In other non-employment litigation contexts, a responding
party has paid a huge price for non-compliance with preservation
and production obligations. In a notable Florida state court
securities fraud case, Defendant Morgan Stanley repeatedly failed,
not only to produce responsive e-mails, but also to be frank with its
544 U.S. 696 (2005).
93 Id. (quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704
(2005)).
94 Id.
95
Id. at 511-12.
96
Id. at 512.
92
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adversary or with the court about the status of collecting those
e-mails."
The consequences were disastrously outcomedeterminative.
The Morgan Stanley suit entailed claims of fraud and
conspiracy as to an acquisition in which the plaintiff sold its 82%
stake in Coleman Inc. to Sunbeam. The Sunbeam shares the
plaintiff had received turned out to be undesirable once Sunbeam
filed for bankruptcy.
Morgan Stanley had been Sunbeam's
financial adviser and underwriter.
On March 1, 2005, Judge Elizabeth Maas granted the
plaintiff's motion for an adverse inference jury instruction, based
on the defendants' knowingly failure to: stop the systematic
overwriting of e-mails every twelve months; conduct proper
searches for back-up tapes that might have contained e-mails;
promptly retract a previously submitted certificate of compliance it
knew to be false (there were 1,400 outstanding back-up tapes);
notify the plaintiff when additional tapes had been located; use
reasonable efforts to search the newly discovered tapes in a timely
manner; process and search data it had isolated for production; or
draft search protocols consistent with previously entered court
orders.98
The March 1 Order granted the plaintiffs request for an
adverse inference instruction based on the defendant's violation of
its "affirmative duty . . . to produce its e-mails."" The Order went

as far as to delineate the judge's agreement to read to the jury, at a
time chosen by opposing counsel, a three page "conclusive"
statement of facts detailing the defendant's eDiscovery failings.'o
Two weeks later, when the defendant had still not fully
complied, the plaintiff renewed a prior motion for entry of default
judgment. On March 23, in partially granting the motion, the
97 Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley (Coleman 1), No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005);
Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley (Coleman II), 2005 WL
674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
98 Coleman I, No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 at *5.
99 Id.
'00 Id. at *7.
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judge found that the defendant had "deliberately and
contumaciously violated numerous discovery orders" and
committed to reading a redacted version of the twenty seven page
amended complaint to the jury.'o1 The prior March 1 three-page
fact statement was to be supplemented with additional eDiscoveryfailure facts found in the subsequent March 23 order, then also
read to the jury.'O2 The impact of the adverse fact findings was not
limited to consciousness of guilt. Per the March 23 order, the jury
was also to be "instructed that it may consider [the e-mail
destruction] facts in determining whether [the defendant] sought to
conceal its offensive conduct when determining whether an award
of punitive damages is appropriate.""'
When the trial began in early April, the defendants' searches
and retrievals were not yet completed and had to be abandoned.
As planned, Judge Maas read the nine-person jury a lengthy
statement, saying, in part: "Morgan Stanley participated in a
scheme to mislead [the plaintiff company] and others and cover up
the massive fraud at Sunbeam until Morgan Stanley and Sunbeam
could close the purchase of Coleman." A few weeks later, a $608
million verdict was reached in favor of the plaintiff, with a further
award of punitive damages over $800 million.'04 Athough on
appeal, the case remains a cautionary tale.
5. New "Safe-Harbor"Amendment to FederalRules
Help has arrived for entities that have their houses in order.
Though the defense bar did not get everything it wanted in the
newly amended version of FRCP 37,'

the change does provide a

' Coleman II, No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *10.
102 id.

103 Id. at *22.

'0 Marietta Cauchi, Morgan Stanley Appeals Decision to Award Perelman
$1.45 Billion, Jury Sides With Perelman In Case Against Morgan Stanley,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2005, at C4; Susanne Craig, How Morgan Stanley
Botched A Big Case by Fumbling E-mails, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2005, at Al.
1es See STAFF OF ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM. 31-32 (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://Reportat51.notlong.com [hereinafter ADVISORY RULES AUGUST REPORT].
The defense bar was in favor of a prior alternative draft, which had provided that
a responding party would not be sanctioned unless its deletion of pertinent
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safe harbor.'06 The "safe harbor" in the newly amended Rule 37(f)
provides that: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not
impose sanctions under these rules for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system." 0 7
This change should provide some relief to entities called upon
to preserve-and thus not, in bad faith, overwrite-electronic
information.'
However, an accompanying change will expand a
litigant's obligations by forcing it to keep abreast of its electronic
information, anywhere that data resides. Whereas an earlier draft
of the new Rule 37(f) had referenced "the party's" electronic
information system,'09 the current draft describes "an electronic
information system.""o This broadening is an intentional effort to
encompass and "protect[] a party who has contracted with an
outside firm to provide electronic information storage, avoiding
potential arguments whether the system can be characterized as
'the party's.' The party remains obliged to ... avoid loss of
information . . . by the outside firm."" The protection consists of

the safe harbor coverage obtained by acting in good faith.

information resulted from violation of a court order or from intentional or
reckless conduct. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin Corp., 306 F.3d
99, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2002) (remanding for reconsideration of denial of
instruction). This backlash was at least partially in response to the Second
Circuit's establishment of "ordinary negligence" as the "culpable state of mind"
triggering an adverse inference instruction.
106 Shira A. Scheindlin
& Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery
Twenty-First
Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 71
Sanctions in the
(2004) (concluding that calls from the defense bar to strengthen the proposed
"safe harbor" protection were unnecessary because courts had already been
taking a balanced approach). Some experts have claimed that judges have been
fair when assessing whether sanctions are warranted on a case-by-case basis.
107

FRCP EDISCOVERY AMENDMENTS, supra note 41, at 40 (emphasis added).

A judge still retains his or her authority to sanction premised on the inherent
power to oversee case management. Id. at 42. See also REPORT, supra note 41,
at C-87-88.
FRCP EDISCOVERY AMENDMENTS, supra note 41, at 41.
1' See ADVISORY RULES AUGUST REPORT, supra note 105, at 32.
110 REPORT, supra note 41, at C-86 (emphasis added).
108

" Id. at C-89.
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6. TIPS and Takeaways
Zubulake V placed the following duties on in-house and outside
counsel: "to effectively communicate to her client its discovery
obligations;""' to "become fully familiar with her client's
document

retention

policies

[and]

...

data

retention

architecture;"" 3 and to "take affirmative steps to monitor
compliance so all sources of discoverable information are
identified and searched."ll 4
The ominous implications of Zubulake V-especially the
specter of an adverse inference jury instruction-are evident. In
addition, practically speaking, the sooner in-house and outside
counsel learn of the scope and contents of the universe of an
entity's relevant information, the better. Pinning down those
parameters early will enable counsel to provide the most effective,
efficient legal and strategic advice.
Additionally, a strict preservation and notification regime can
go a long way toward keeping a client from getting blind-sided
down the line. When previously missing e-mails crop up months
or years later in accessible electronic message strings or in
hardcopy printouts, it can be a major blow to the confidences of
the client and counsel in both the quality of their collection efforts
and in each other.
At the earliest possible juncture, try to identify key time
frames, key players (including those in Human Resources), and
key subject matter (including pertinent acronyms, if any).
Ascertain whether retention, destruction or recycling protocols
exist and are being followed, not only in general but also once
litigation should have been anticipated, let alone commenced. If
such procedures do not exist or have not been triggered, then
advise your client post haste to implement them. Do your best to

112

Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004).

" Id. at 432.
114 Id. at 433

(emphasis added) ("[A] party cannot reasonably be trusted to
receive the ... instruction once and to fully comply with it without the active
supervision of counsel.").
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obtain from your client the identities and contact information for
all key Information Technology personnel."'
As to the litigation hold notice, advise your client as to the
ideal content, recipients and dissemination method (perhaps using
the e-mail system's return receipt confirmation feature). Prepare a
draft cover e-mail and draft message. Follow up periodically.
Make sure you and your client document all preservation steps
taken.
7. Meet and Confer-26(f)Conference
An efficient approach could be to address with opposing
counsel many eDiscovery issues early. The recent changes to
Federal Rules 26 and 16 (and to Form 35) contemplate a wideranging Rule 26(f) conference."'6 Examples of helpful topics are
whether one or more parties will be requesting the restoration of
relatively inaccessible data,"'7 potential collaboration as to search
criteria,"' format(s) of exchange of electronic information,"' and
avoiding inadvertent waivers of privilege.120
The newly amended rules identify those topics as warranting
early discussion, as well as the parties' respective information
systems technology, the scope and sources of discovery and
It is also wise to quickly identify current and former employees whose hard
discs need to be forensically captured, as well as the locations of those desktops,
PC's, and laptops. See generally infra Section III(B)(1); Mary Mack, Electronic
Discovery v. Computer Forensics: The Differences You Need to Know, LIN's
LEGAL TECH NEWSL., Aug. 2003, http://www.fiosinc.com/resources/pdfFiles/
200308 ed computer forensics.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
116 The newly amended versions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)-(6), Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(f)(l)-(6) and Form 35 are designed to create a framework "to discuss 'any
issues relating to preserving discoverable information' [such as] ...
115

preservation[,] ... any issues relating to . . . electronically stored information,

including the form or forms in which it should be produced [and] issues relating
to the assertion of privilege and work-product protection . . . in the parties'
initial conference." REPORT, supra note 41, at C-24; cf D. Del. Default
Standard for Discovery of Electronic Documents at §§ 2-3, http://www.ded.
uscourts.gov/Announce/HotPage2l.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
" See infra Section III(B).
118 See infra Section III(C).
19 See infra Section III(D).
120 See infra Section III(E).

N.C. J. L. & TECH.

32

[VOL. 8: 1

"individuals with special knowledge" of same (likely to be the
litigants' IT leaders).12 ' There were already multiple examples of
court-ordered IT involvement in the interim period leading up to
the official enactment of the new rules.122
B. Collect
1. Some Lessonsfrom Recent Collection Case Law
A thorough array of effective employee agreements and
policies, coupled with additional prior planning, can lead to
relatively easy collections. Contracts governing employees' use of
employer-provided networks and computers can trump any
ultimate employee arguments as to the reasonableness of a

purported expectation of privacy. 123
Furthermore, as soon as there is concern that a particular
employee may bring a claim, an employer should consider
obtaining a forensically sound image of each computer and laptop
provided to that employee.124 Similarly, where misappropriation of
trade secrets is suspected, prompt confiscation of computers, if
possible, would be a sound proactive approach.
If prompt action is not, or cannot be, taken, then it may take
multiple courthouse trips-for temporary restraining orders,
"freeze" orders, and/or search orders-to prevent alteration or
FRCP EDISCOVERY AMENDMENTS, supra note 41, at 20-26.
See, e.g., Fischer v. UPS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21047 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
19, 2006) (ordering employer to produce an IT staffer for a phone conference
about efforts to locate missing e-mail attachment containing managers' draft
salaries in retaliation suit following racial-discrimination suit); Tilberg v. Next
Mgmt. Co., No. 04CIV7373, 2005 WL 2759860 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005)
(requiring the defendant-former manager/agent-to allow the plaintiff s expert
access to central servers and local machines after the defendant's IT consultant
conceded error in prior statement that there were no relevant active files in case
comprised of fraud, contract and fiduciary duty claims by model).
123 See, e.g., Biby v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 419 F.3d 845 (8th Cir.
2005); TBG Ins. Servs. v. Super. Ct. (Zieminski), 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (including work-at-home PC).
124 Henry v. IAC/Interactive Group, No. C05-151ORSM, 2006 WL 354971
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2006) (finding that a manager who had threatened to
bring discrimination claims took employer-issued laptop with her when told to
go on leave).
121

122
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spoliation.125 Note, though, that even if early confiscation or
imaging does not occur, later uses-especially mass deletions of
any pertinent computer files-will only make matters worse for the
party who engages in such activity.126
2. eDiscovery Costs Allocation
a. Some Quick Background
One key legal and logistical issue at the "Collect" step is which
side(s) will foot the bill for extraordinary costs. Nowadays,
responding parties have a tougher row to hoe. Frequently,
requesting parties-often plaintiffs-successfully argue that, as in
the paper world, they should not be forced to bear an eDiscovery
cost burden that is "a product of the defendant[s] record-keeping
scheme over which the [p]laintiffs have no control."l27
See also Yanaki v. lomed, Inc., 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005) (ordering,
ex parte, to direct sheriff to lead search of ex-employer's house, no actionable
§ 1983 civil rights claim), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. May 1, 2006);
Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. v. Riley Serv, Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003) (issuing a "freeze" order to "preclude the innocent or intentional
alteration or destruction of evidence" as to electronic files taken from former
employer when the defendants had left to open their own company);
AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, Appellate Case No. 05-02037, 2006 WL 60547
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 1, 2006) (ordering not only the return of all confidential
documents but also the imaging of personal PC of non-employee, who had been
e-mailed by former employee suspected of misappropriating trade secrets);
Henry v. IAC/Interactive Group, No. C05-151ORSM, 2006 WL 354971 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 14, 2006) (issuing injunction mandating that laptops be returned to
former employer rather than merely tendered to "neutral" forensics firm where
employment contract required return of all company equipment).
1 6 See, e.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., L.L.C., No. 05 C 3003, 2006
WL 1308629 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (entering default judgment for breach of noncompete against former employee who had deleted and altered thousands of files
while delaying the production of laptop); see also Kucala Enters. Ltd. v. Auto
Wax Co., Inc., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 487 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (May 27, 2003)
(dismissing with prejudice the plaintiffs patent infringement suit based on one
company owner's eleventh-hour deletion of 12,000 files with "Evidence
Eliminator" software).
127 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig. (Ciba), 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *6, Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526 (N.D. Ill.
June 15, 1995) (granting class plaintiffs' motion to compel defendant
corporations, including Ciba-Geigy Corp., to produce its responsive computer125
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Furthermore, given a more technologically savvy judiciary,
responding parties can no longer count on a judge to have a kneejerk reaction of engaging in cost-shifting analysis whenever there
is a discovery dispute regarding electronic evidence.'2 8
b. Federal Case Law (Zubulake I & III and its progeny)
i. Zubulake I's Tripartite Framework
The landscape on the cost-shifting issue changed'29 in 2003 due
to the multi-factor test pronounced in Zubulake I.P" There, a grant

of a motion to compel arose in a case entailing claims for gender
The court criticized prior
discrimination and retaliation."'
decisions as having engaged in a cost-shifting analysis as a kneejerk reaction based on the faulty "assum[ption] that an undue
burden or expense may arise simply because electronic evidence is
involved." 3 2 "[C]ost-shifting may effectively end discovery,
especially when private parties are engaged in litigation with large
corporations." 33
As discussed in Section II(B) above, the threshold issue in
Zubulake I divided the world of electronic information into two
distinct but broad categories:

stored e-mail) (citing Delozier v. First Nat'l Bank of Gatlingurg, 109 F.R.D.
161, 164 (E.D. TN 1986) (citing Kozlowski v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D.
73 (D. Mass. 1976))).
28
1 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
129 Landon Thomas, Jr., A Ruling Makes E-mail Evidence More Accessible,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2003., at Cl.
130 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 316.
131 Id.

Id. at 318 (describing a predecessor decision as follows: "Murphy Oil
USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *3
(E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (suggesting that "application of [multi-factor costshifting analysis] is appropriate whenever 'a party ... contends that the burden
or expense of the discovery outweighs the benefit of the discovery"')).
133 Id. ("As large companies increasingly
move to entirely paper-free
environments, the frequent use of cost-shifting will have the effect of crippling
discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases.").
132
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(1) "[D]ata that is kept in an accessible format, [as to
which] the usual rules of discoveryl3 4 apply: the
responding party should pay the costs of producing
responsive data ....
(2) "[E]lectronic data [that] is relatively inaccessible,
such as in backup tapes," as to which a "court
should consider cost-shifting."'3 6
Thus, under Zubulake I, cost-shifting is contemplated only
when there is a pending request to restore relatively inaccessible
data to status as accessible, active data.
Zubulake I then modified the multi-factor test espoused by a
prior decision.'3 7 Once a small sample of inaccessible data has
been produced, 3 1 the court held that, "in conducting the costSee FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. See also Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 315-16
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing rules at length).
"' Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (emphasis added). The case further defines
the three subsets of "accessible" media, "listed in order from most accessible to
least accessible:" (1) "Active, online data," such as hard drives; (2) "Near-line
data," such as optical disks; and (3) "Offline storage/archives[,] ... lack[ing]
'the coordinated control of an intelligent disk subsystem,' and is, in the lingo,
JBOD ('Just a Bunch of Disks')." Id. at 318-19.
136 Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 319-20 (emphasis added) (defining "[b]ackup
tapes" and "[e]rased, fragmented or damaged data" as "inaccessible" media).
1'
Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Co., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(ordering the plaintiffs to bear costs of production and the defendants to
continue to bear expense of reviews for privileged or confidential material upon
applying eight-factor balancing approach). The Zubulake I test eliminated two
of the Rowe factors, namely "the specificity of the discovery request" and "the
purposes for which the responding party maintains the requested data."
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321. The "purposes" concept was eclipsed by Judge
Scheindlin's accessibility/inaccessibility demarcation: "[w]hether the data is
kept for a business purpose or for disaster recovery does not affect its
accessibility, which is the practical basis for calculating the cost of production."
Id. at 321-22. Even in "certain limited instances where the very purpose of
maintaining the data will be to produce it to the opposing party ... cost-shifting
would not be applicable in the first place; the relevant statute or rule would
dictate the extent of discovery and the associated costs." Id. at 322 (citing, as an
example, SEC requests for "communications sent by [a] broker or dealer . ..
relating to his business as such" because "such communications must be
maintained pursuant to SEC Rule 17a-4," namely 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4).
" Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
134
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shifting analysis, the following factors should be considered,
weighted more-or-less in the following order":'
1. The extent to which the request is specifically
tailored to discover relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other
sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the
amount in controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the
resources available to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs
and its incentive to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the

information. 140
This new test was applied to ninety-four back-up tapes
previously identified as responsive.
The court ordered the
defendant to: (1) produce "all responsive e-mails that exist on its
optical disks or on its active servers . .. ;" (2) produce "responsive
emails ... from any five backups [sic] tapes selected by [the

plaintiff];" and (3) "prepare an affidavit detailing the results of its
search, as well as the time and money spent."l41 After reviewing
the contents of the . . . tapes and [the] certification, the Court will

conduct the appropriate cost-shifting analysis."1

42

ii. Zubulake III's Application of Seven-Factor "Marginal
Utility" Test
A month later, in a hearing that would generate Zubulake III,143
the parties came back to court and, of course, expressed different
views as to their respective results of analyzing the small sample.
The court applied the seven-factor test to the information pulled
139 id

40

1
141

142
143

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
id

d2

Zubulake v. UJBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake Ill), 216 F.R.D. 280 (2003).
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from the five back-up tapes chosen by the plaintiff from what
turned out to be seventy-seven (rather than ninety-four) responsive
back-up tapes.
Restoration (conducted by a vendor) plus
production (including attorney and paralegal review fees) had cost
the defendant $19,000.1'
Per Zubulake I, the list of factors was a guide rather than a rigid
directive to mechanically count, add, and compare.'45 The court
assigned heavy weight to the first two factors, namely narrow
tailoring and (lack of) availability from other sources.146 The
weighing of the first two factors led the court to conclude that the
sample restoration, resulting in the production of relevant e-mail,
had demonstrated that the plaintiffs discovery request was indeed
narrowly tailored to discover relevant information.'4 7 While some
subject matter had been addressed in other documents, the
additional e-mails containing the related content were only
available from the back-up tapes. 1"
Given the nature of the claims, the court reasoned that direct
discrimination evidence might only be available through
restoration.'49 Thus, the marginal utility of the requested further
discovery might be quite high.' Given that the existence of such
evidence was still speculative at best, the plaintiff had shown "that
the marginal utility was potentially high."'"' In that the defendant

'"Id. at 283.
145 Id. at 289 (citing Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322).
146 Id. at 284.
The court explained that "the first two factors together
comprised the 'marginal utility test' announced in McPeek v. Ashcroft: The
more likely it is that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a
claim or defense, the fairer it is that the [responding party] search at its own
expense. The less likely it is, the more unjust it would be to make the
[responding party] search at its own expense. The difference is 'at the margin."'
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34
(D.D.C. 2001)).
147 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 288.
14 8 id.

149
50

Id. at 287.

Id.
1s1 Id.
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bore the burden of proving that cost-shifting was warranted, the
two-factor marginal utility test tipped slightly against shifting.'52
As to the five other less important factors, the court found that
factors 3 and 4 militated against cost-shifting, factors 5 and 6 were
"neutral," and factor 7 supported cost-shifting.' When weighing
the likelihood of recovery of additional valuable information
against some factors that cut slightly in the other direction, the
court deemed it appropriate to shift a minority of the costs to the
plaintiff, i.e., the requesting party.'54
iii. Zubulake III's Shift of Some Restoration-plus-Search Costs
and Prohibition on Shift of Review-plus-Production Costs
The Zubulake III court concluded that a 25% cost assignment
to the requesting party comported with the policies behind the two
key countervailing pitfalls of (1) "chill[ing] the rights of litigants to
pursue meritorious claims," and (2) "unduly burdening" the
defendant with too much of the expense of a "somewhat
speculative" search.'
Once the 25/75 split was pronounced, a
pivotal issue remained: whether the 25% shift should apply to the
entire $274,000 cost, or only to the $166,000 portion needed to
restore the remaining seventy-two backup tapes.' 6 So, the big
practical difference was whether there would be a shift of $68,000
or of $41,500.
Under the Zubulake III approach, two basic principles govern
allocation. First, only restoration and search costs could be
subject to shifting in that "[r]estoration[,] the act of making
inaccessible material accessible[, is a] 'special purpose' or
'extraordinary step,""" and "[s]earch costs should also be shifted
152

id.

Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 287-89 (2003).
154 Id. at 289.
I id.
156 The estimated total cost of producing those seventy-two tapes (restorationand-searching costs plus attorney/paralegal review time costs) was calculated as
follows: 72 X $3,800.69 (i.e., $19,003.43 - 5) per tape = $273,649.39. Id. at
283, 287, 289-90. The breakdown between the estimated costs of restoring and
searching and attorney/paralegal review, respectively, was $165,954.67 and
$107,694.72. Id. at 283, 287, 289-90.
5
1 1 Id. at 290.
15
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because they are so intertwined with the restoration process; a
vendor ... will not only develop and refine the search script, but

also necessarily execute the search as it conducts
restoration."' 58
"[C]ost-shifting is only appropriate
inaccessible-but otherwise discoverable-data."'
Second,
responding party should always bear the cost of reviewing
producing electronic data once ...

the
for
"the
and

converted to an accessible

form."l
"[T]echnology may increasingly permit litigants to
reconstruct lost or inaccessible information, but once restored to an
accessible form, the usual rules of discovery apply."''
60

iv. Zubulake 's Progeny
For the most part, over the past year and a half the Zubulake
approach has become the benchmark in federal eDiscovery cost
allocation case law. Give or take a factor or two,162 many decisions
have followed the seven-factor marginal-utility-based approach.
Some recent decisions have shifted a percentage of costs to the
requesters; while others have ordered that all costs remain the
burden of the responding party.'

'58 id.
19 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (2003).
16o Id. at 290.
161 Id. at 291 ("Notwithstanding this ruling, [the defendant/producing-party]
can potentially impose a shift of all of its costs, attorney's fees included, by
making an offer to the plaintiff under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 68.").
162 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229
F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (adding eighth factor in employment case,-"the importance of the
requested discovery in resolving the issues at stake in the litigation"-to
Zubulake's Step 3 and then shifting 75% of restore and search costs to putative
class action plaintiffs).
163 Applied Discovery's "Law Library" provides summaries of pre- and postZubulake cost allocation decisions.
See LexisNexis Applied Discovery,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawLibrary/caseSummariesByTopi
c.asp (follow "Costs shifted to requesting party" hyperlink, "[flactors" hyperlink
and "[p]roducing party pays costs of production" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).

40
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c. Reminder: Your State's Rules May Differ'"
As the clich6 goes: don't try this at home. Though the
Zubulake framework has generally been gaining approval in the
United States District Courts, remember that this decision is not
binding anywhere, let alone in state courts. Indeed, as two bicoastal decisions made clear last year, some states' procedural
rules mandate that the requesting party bear production costs.
In New York's inaugural eDiscovery decision,'65 a judge
invoked the general rule of C.P.L.R. § 3103(a) to preclude costshifting from even being contemplated:
[C]ost shifting of electronic discovery is not an issue in New York
since the courts have held that, under the CPLR, the party seeking
discovery should incur the costs incurred in the production of discovery
material. CPLR 3103(a) specifically grants the court authority to issue
a protective order to prevent a party from incurring unreasonable
expenses in complying with discovery demands.
Therefore, the
analysis of whether electronic discovery should be permitted in New
York is much simpler than it is in the federal courts. The court need
only determine whether the material is discoverable and whether the
party seeking the discovery is willing to bear the cost of production of
the electronic material. 1 66

Thus, the judge would not compel production until the plaintiffs
agreed to pay for "the costs incurred for the production of [the]
data."16 ' However, the following year, a different New York
decision pointed out that the same statute contemplates an afterthe-fact motion for cost allocation if needed "to prevent
unreasonable annoyance, expense,

...

or other prejudice."' 8

' In addition, always be on the lookout for any federal and/or state statute
providing a basis for fees. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044,
1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a), 3664 (1996)) (upholding
repayment to employer of fees incurred in computer forensic investigation of
employee/inside trader, who had not only embezzled but also "purposefully

covered his tracks as he concealed his numerous acts of wrongdoing . . . over a

period of years").
165 Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., 2004 N.Y. slip op. 50967U
(N.Y. Misc. 2004).
166 Id. at 8 (citations
omitted).
16
1 d. at 25.
168 Weiller v. N.Y. Life Ins., 2005 N.Y. slip op. 50341U
at 1 (N.Y. Misc.
2005) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3103(a)).
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California's highest court's let stand the first published cost
allocation decision in late 2005 in Toshiba v. Superior Court
(Lexar Media).'6 ' There, the Sixth District Court of Appeals relied
on the "data compilations" translation exception of California
Code of Civil Procedure 203 1(g)(1)" 0 to reverse an order that had
declined to shift any back-up tape restoration costs."' Toshiba
started with the premise that the responding party bears its own
costs.17 2 It then addressed California's statutory exception for
"data compilations translation" in the context of back-up tapes
requiring manipulation to be restored to "reasonably usable
form." 7 3 Thus, California law apparently diverges from the federal
Zubulake approach-the latter ostensibly applying the three-phase
framework whenever there is a dispute as to "relatively
inaccessible data," such as back-ups.174
The appellate court ruled that cost-shifting of reasonable
expenses should occur wherever the trial judge finds that the atissue restoration is indeed a "translation.""'
However, the
169

Toshiba v. Super. Ct. (Lexar Media), 2005 Cal. LEXIS 11999 (Cal. 2005).

170 As of July 1, 2005, Section 2031(g)(1) was relocated to Cal. Code Civ.

Proc.§ 2031.280.
17i Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 124 Cal. App. 4th 762
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
172 Id. at 772 ("Code Civ. Proc § 2031(g)(1)
is a legislatively determined
exception to the general rule that the responding party should bear the cost of
responding to discovery.").
1 Id. at 764 ("When there is no dispute about the application of the statute,
the statute automatically shifts the expense of translating a data compilation into
usable form to the demanding party.").
174 Id. at 771 (approving the federal Zubulake/McPeek "small sample"
approach as an effective way for the trial court to analyze the underlying factual
issues in a back-up tapes dispute); see also supra text accompanying notes 4550, 134-38 & 143-44.
17 Id. at 773. As to policy:
If the respondent is expected to bear its own expense, the demanding
party has no incentive to demand anything less than all electronic data
in any form . . . . [S]uch an unlimited demand can result in
astronomical costs to the responding party. . . . If the demanding party

were required to bear the expense, then presumably that party would
only demand what it really needs. 'There is certainly no controlling
authority for the proposition that restoring all backup tapes is necessary
in every case . . . .'

[T]he statute requires that the demanding party
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appellate court did stop short of ruling that "the demanding party
must always pay all the costs associated with retrieving usable data
from backup tapes," instead pointing out that "Section 203 1(g)(1)
is clear that the demanding party is expected to pay only its
reasonable expense for a necessary translation."' 76
Nor did
Toshiba identify the categories of the costs to be covered therein.
Unlike Zubulake III, which opined on the cost categories that
are "shift-able" (e.g., restoration and searching) and those that are
not (e.g., review and production), Toshiba characterized these
issues as "purely factual" ones left to the trial judge's discretion.'
On remand, the trial court was to assess the applicability of Section
2031(g)(1) to the back-up tapes. In that those tapes ostensibly
required much manipulation to be restored to "reasonably usable
form" and the utility of their contents was still unclear, the
appellate court suggested that a Zubulake-Step-2-type "small
sample" approach might be wise."'
C. F.LN.D. (FileIdentificationNarrowedBy Definition)
Technologists and eDiscovery tools provide their greatest value
by processing and culling the collected data to greatly narrow the
size and scope of the amount of data that will proceed to the
"Review" phase. Winnowing methods can include data deduplication, keyword searching, metadata parameters and other
data definitions. If required by the project's plan, it is also possible
during this phase to use a variety of litigation tools to convert
bear only its reasonable expense and then only when translation is
necessary to obtain usable data.
Id. at 771 (quoting McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2001))
(citations omitted).
' Id. at 773 (emphasis added).
17 Id. ("Section 2031(g)(1)
is clear that the demanding party is expected to
pay only its reasonable expense for a necessary translation. Reasonableness and
necessity are purely factual issues.").
178 Id. at 772 (citing Zubulake 1, F.R.D. 309, 323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)) ("Since
it may be impossible to determine in advance whether or to what extent the
backup tapes will yield relevant material, the court should encourage the parties
to meet and confer about translating a sample of the tapes . . . and to otherwise
develop information in order to inform the analysis of the extent to which
[plaintiff/requestor] should bear the expenses [defendant/responder] has
claimed.").
76
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native files to either TIFF or PDF images for review and/or
production. This conversion process can also occur following the
Review phase.
Unless there are countervailing strategies, there may be
benefits to be derived from collaborating with opposing counsel
regarding selection criteria.'
If that is the case, the question of
when a propounding party gains input into the responding party's
selection criteria can be very tricky.'s A responding party will
tend to insist on the right to "go it alone" in the first instance."'
That approach, especially when coupled with sweeping early
representations that "everything" has already been produced, may
ultimately lead to an implicit finding of an ethical violation of the
fraud-on-the-court variety.182 In contrast, a requesting party will
want to have input ab initio,' unless of course, it fears a reciprocal
request from its litigation adversary.
Yet, the alternative and more adversarial approach may result
in inefficiencies as well as failure to comply with the types of
obligations discussed in Section III(A) above.' 84 Thus, potential
selection criteria collaboration is an apt topic for the beefed-up
Rule 26(f) conference found in the recent Federal Rule
amendments.'

17 See Brownstone, supra note 39, at 48-53 (discussing Tulip Computers Int'l
B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 (D. Del. Apr. 30,
2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001)).
180 See Brownstone, supra note 39, at 48-53 (discussing Tulip Computers Int'l
B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 (D. Del. Apr. 30,
2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001)).
181 When responding to a government inquiry, one should expect entirely
different atmospherics. In other words, the DOJ or SEC will want complete
disclosure and cooperation as to search parameters.
182 See, e.g., Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7792 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002).
183 See id.
184 Sdo

15See

supra Section III(A)(7).
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D. Review-Form and FormatOf Exchange
1. Introduction
The focus of the Review and Produce steps is on the format(s)
in which the parties exchange information. Some of the most
frequently litigated sub-issues have been whether paper production
suffices,'" discoverability of metadata and/or embedded data, and
whether to request and produce in native format or in "uniform
image format" (TIFF or PDF).'" Other oft-disputed issues beyond
the scope of this paper are the (in)sufficiency of unorganized sets
of electronic information and the produce-ability of databases
and/or software proprietary to the responding party.'

In re Honeywell Int'l, Inc. Securities Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20602
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2003) (ordering electronic production and holding that in
putative securities class action, third party accounting firm's previous
production of hardcopies of workpapers insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)
because information "not produced as kept in the usual course of business").
For the rare modem case in which paper was sufficient, see Northern Crossarm
Co. v. Chem. Specialties, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5381 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 3,
2004) (presenting unique circumstances, in which production request and meetand-confer correspondence failed to specify "electronic" and prior costly
production of hardcopies, 65,000 e-mails had "mimicked the manner in which
186

... information was stored electronically").
187 See generally Kristin M. Nimsger & Michele C.S. Lange, E-Document
Conversion & Native Document Review, LJN LEGAL TECH NEWS, Dec. 2003;
KROLL ONTRACK, E-EVIDENCE THOUGHT LEADERSHIP LUNCHEON: ROWE V.
ZUBULAKE (Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.krollontrack.com/upcomingevents/
documents/zubulake.pdf [hereinafter JUDGES]; see also Mary Mack, Native File
Review: Simplifying Electronic Discovery?, LJN's LEGAL TECH NEWSL., May
1, 2005; Mark Reber, Native File Review: What Problem Are We Solving?,
TECHNOLAWYER, Mar. 8, 2005, http://Native-Reber.notlong.com.
188 Jinks-Umstead v. England, No. CIV.A.99-2691
GK/JMF, 2005 WL

775780 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2005) (granting new trial in discrimination case to allow

the plaintiff to present its case using new electronic evidence that the defendant
had initially claimed it no longer possessed but which turned out to be
retrievable from database); In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 23989, 2004-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,620 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2004)
(ordering parties to provide all transactional data in electronic format, to extent
reasonably feasible; not requiring the defendant to provide technical assistance

to help the plaintiffs understand and make use of electronic data).
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2. Key Definitions
Metadata is "data about data."' 9 In eDiscovery, the three
principal kinds of such data are: e-mail, file system, and document
(imbedded/embedded). Each such type of data requires slightly
different review and production strategies.
A "native data" file is one "[i]n the original file format in
which [it was] created (i.e., in the specific software applications
used to create each individual document)."'" Some examples of
native data are Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, and
WordPerfect.
In contrast, "uniform" or "standard" image format is an agreedupon file format into which all different types of native files are
converted solely for review and/or production in civil litigation.19 '
Often tagged image format (TIFF) plus searchable index is a
uniform format; sometimes portable document format (PDF) is
used as a uniform format as well.
"Searchable TIFF" is an oxymoron. It is a litigation fiction
reflecting the exchange of a set of imaged electronic files that are
accompanied by searchable text associated with those files.
3. Native vs. Electronic-EvidenceDiscovery (EED) Platforms
Many strategies and cost issues inform the decision of whether
to review, produce, and/or seek files in their native format(s).19 2
The relative technological and financial resources of the parties are
likely to play a big role, as well as the significance, or lack thereof,
of metadata-such as spreadsheet formulas, tracked changes,
creation date, e-mail fields, cross-file links, etc.-its relationship to
the matter at hand.193 In some instances, it may be better for a

190

See Brownstone, supra note 39, at 2, 3, 19, 31 & nn.5-7, 56, 95-96.
Nimsger & Lange, supra note 187, at 2.

'91

Id. at 1-2.

192

Brownstone, supra note 39, at

189

2, 23.

193 See, e.g., Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-

MLV, 2003 WL 21468573 229 F.R.D. 550 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (ordering nonprivileged files produced to the defendant in their native electronic formats,
rather than as image files in trade secret and patent cases regarding spinal fusion
medical technology; appointing special master technology or computer expert to
oversee discovery and setting forth detailed protocol).
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party to review and/or produce in native format. In other
instances, an EED platform or database may be preferable.
In the past year, the trend toward reviewing and producing in
native file formats has accelerated. In their meet and confer
discussions, civil litigants are often agreeing to exchange in native.
However, at times, strategies may militate against requesting
native. One consideration is reciprocity, namely that a party
requesting native can expect to, in turn, be asked for native.
When a requesting party assesses whether to ask for native,
some factors a party might weigh entail the relative position of the
opposing party as to whether the party is: (1) a plaintiff; (2) a
defendant who has interposed cross-claims or counter-claims;
(3) an individual or an entity likely to produce much data; and/or
(4) an individual or entity able to expend or marshal the monetary
and technology resources needed to deal effectively with native
file formats.
When the parties cannot agree, the current judicial trend
continues to be toward native production and away from TIFF.
For example, one recent decision deemed TIFF files to be
inadequate because their content and design differ from native file
formats.194 Another recent opinion required native file production,
so that the requesting party could run searches and review the
metadata.'

Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Systemi Elettroiici Industriali S.R.I., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10838 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006) (patent case).
195 Nova Measuring Instruments Ltd. v. Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F.
Supp. 2d
1121 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2006).
194
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4. Metadata-When Discoverable?
Metadata or Imbedded-Data is discoverable when needed or
relevant to a matter at hand.' 6 A stark example of a past context in
which metadata was discoverable was when a contention of backdating a file was at issue.'" Yet the trend toward native may tip
the balance in other types of situations.
The recent amendment to Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B)-(C)
intentionally avoids specific reference to metadata, yet the
associated comment evinces a desire to keep metadata from being
produced absent an affirmative showing of need.198
196

S.D.N.Y. Magistrate Judge Francis has informally stated:
[T]he touchstone... is the purpose or ... relevance of the particular
document at issue. [Whether] the metadata or the embedded data is
going to be highly relevant ... dictates [the] form of production.

...

[I]n any large document case these days, it's probably irresponsible for
the requesting party not to ask for it in searchable form in any
event.... I think the days of producing large volumes of paper
documents are pretty close to over but that doesn't solve the situation
about what form of searchable data.
JUDGES, supra note 187, at 25.
197 See, e.g., Munshani v. Signal Lake Venture Fund II, 805 N.E.2d 998
(Mass. App. Ct.2004) (affirming dismissal of breach of contract action and
award of expert and attorney fees, in light of determination by court-appointed,
neutral expert of the lack of authenticity of copy of e-mail submitted by the
plaintiff as part of opposition to dismiss motion based on statute of frauds);
Premier Homes & Land v. Cheswell, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D. Mass.
2002) (awarding $24,000 in expert and attorney fees, upon the plaintiffs
voluntary dismissal with prejudice of eviction dispute between two corporations,
where, once imaging of the plaintiffs President's hard disc had begun, he
confessed that, after the fact, he had fabricated a lease addendum and a
transmittal e-mail, the latter by "pasting most of a heading from an earlier,
legitimate message and altering the subject matter line").
198 In a prior draft, the pertinent Advisory Committee Note quoted the Manual
for Complex Litigation (4th) § 11.446 to the effect that "production of wordprocessing files with all associated metadata ... should be conditioned upon a
showing of need or sharing expenses." See Report's August 3, 2004 draft, at 14.
Cf D. Del. Default Standard for Discovery of Electronic Documents,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/Announce/HotPage2 1.htm, providing:
If, during ... [the] Rule 26(f) conference, the parties cannot agree to

the format . . ., electronic documents shall be produced ... as image

files (e.g., PDF or TIFF).... [T]he producing party must preserve the
integrity of the electronic document's contents, i.e., the original
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However, last year in the employment case Williams v.
Sprint/UnitedManagement,'9 9 a federal judge attempted to fill the
gap in this area of law. The court analyzed the then-pending
Federal Rules changes, found them inconclusive, and came up with
a framework of its own.
Williams found that, absent a timely objection or a stipulation
to the contrary, an order to produce in native format presumptively
encompasses metadata-even if the request for production did not
explicitly reference metadata.200 Consequently, the court lambasted
an employer/defendant that had responded to a native-production
order by scrubbing metadata out of thousands of Excel
spreadsheets.
Williams was a class action reduction-in-force (RIF) case based
on allegations of age discrimination.2 0' Relatively late in the
discovery process, the parties stipulated in open court that the
employer would produce thousands of Excel spreadsheets in native
format. The stipulation did not authorize the employer to scrub
metadata or lock cells in the spreadsheets. Yet the employer
unilaterally took both actions before producing the spreadsheets in
electronic form. It did not make a log of its activities.
The court found that the then-pending new version of Federal
Rule 34(b) and its accompanying reports and notes were
inconclusive.20 2 It analyzed, but then deviated from, the nonbinding Sedona Principles' presumption against producing
metadata absent a showing of relevance.203 Instead, the Williams
court analyzed the new Rule 34's phrase "as ... maintained in the

ordinary course of business" to mean electronic files "with their
metadata intact."2 04 Williams further ruled that, in the context of
formatting of the document, its metadata and, where applicable, its
revision history. After initial production in image file format is
complete, a party must demonstrate particularized need for production
of electronic documents in their native format.
199 30 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005).
200
Id. at 653-54.
201 See 30 F.R.D. 640 (D.
Kan. 2005).
202 See
id
203 See
id
204id
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meet-and-confer discussions as to native, metadata is to be
produced even if not specifically sought in the request for
production.205
As to the significance of metadata found in various computer
applications, Williams held that, on a spectrum of metadata's
relative importance, Excel spreadsheets were in between the
extremes of:
(1) word processing applications, "where the
metadata is usually not critical to understanding the substance of
the document;" and (2) database applications, where any given
"database is a completely undifferentiated mass of tables of data
[and t]he metadata is the key to showing the relationships between
the data."2 06
In that factual situation, since the beginning of the lawsuit, the
class of plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant had, based upon
workers' ages, re-worked employee pools to improve distribution
so as to pass adverse-impact analysis. Hence, the spreadsheets'
metadata's relevance included: the content of changes; the dates of
changes; the identities of individuals who had made changes; and
any other metadata useable to determine the relative contents of
drafts and final versions of the respective files. Thus, when it
knew it had to produce in native format, absent first making a
timely objection, it was disingenuous for the producing party, at
the eleventh hour, to unilaterally decide to scrub metadata and to
lock formulas and then produce anyway.

Id. at 653-54; cf new Rule 26(b)(2)(B), supra note 41 and accompanying
text. New Rule 26(b)(2)(B) reflects, in the context of data not reasonably
accessible, a different type of burden-shift. Note also that, in contrast to the
restoration of inaccessible data, metadata scrubbing consists of an affirmative
act designed to reduce the set of details to be disclosed to an adversary.
206 Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt., 30 F.R.D. 640, 647 (D.
Kan. 2005).
205
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E. Produce-InadvertentDisclosure
1. Privilege Waiver-Introduction
The larger the amounts of electronic material produced in
native format, the greater the odds that privileged content and/or
metadata will get disclosed.207
Electronic information is protected by the same traditional
legal privileges applicable to paper, including the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine.20 8 There are three case
law approaches to privilege waiver: strict (intent is irrelevant);209
lenient (no waiver absent intentional conduct);210 and case-by-case
multi-factor balancing tests.21 '

JUDGES, supra note 187, at 24 ("Are you required to review every drop
because there's a risk of a complete waiver ... as to subject matter?"); see also
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47853, at * 34-35
207

& n.57 (D. Kan. Jul. 1, 2006) ("[V]olume ...

and . . . [o]ther aspects of

electronically stored information pose particular difficulties for privilege
review.") (quoting FRCP EDISCOVERY AMENDMENTS, supra note 41, at 24),
adheredto on reconsiderationby, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65485 (D. Kan. Sept.
13, 2006) (ordering return of electronic documents deemed inadvertently
produced).
208 See, e.g., Isom v. Bank of Am., 628 S.E.2d 458 (N.C. App. 2006)
(affirming trial judge's exercise of discretion in wrongful termination action);
Terry L. Hill & Jennifer S. Johnson, Impact Of Electronic Data Upon An
Attorney's Client, 54 FED'N DEF. & CORP. COUNSEL. Q. 95, n.29 &
accompanying text (2004) (citing Michael Marron, Discoverabilityof "Deleted"
E-Mail: Time for a Closer Examination, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 895, 913
(2002), available at http://fdcc.digitalbay.net/documents/hill-W04.htm) (last
visited Nov. 9, 2006).
209 See, e.g., FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992); Underwater
Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
210 See, e.g., CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 412-14
(D.N.J. 1995); Mendenhall v. Berber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D.
Ill. 1982).
211 See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
81574 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2006) (determining, under five-factor test, that
document was inadvertently produced and thus requiring its return to the other
side); United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F. Supp. 672, 676 (M.D. Pa.
1994) (finding e-mails as to billing statements between different attorneys for
some defendants apparently produced in paper form); Alldread v. City of
Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993).
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The majority view is the case-by-case approach,212 with factors
including: the reasonableness of the precautions taken relative to
the production's size; the number of inadvertent disclosures; the
extent of the disclosure(s); and the remedial measures taken (and
whether the producing party exhibited delay in effectuating
them).2 13
A waiver may extend beyond the file(s) and document(s) in
question to encompass the entire covered subject matter.214
2. Privilege Waiver-Recent eDiscovery Case Law
Until recently, most eDiscovery waiver decisions had
addressed disclosure of hardcopy printouts of e-mail.215 Yet, as can
be gleaned even from the non-electronic decisions summarized
below, the same principles also apply to purely electronic
information.
In Spring 2004, two subject-matter waiver decisions came
down. First, in a wrongful discharge action in June 2004, an Ohio
state court ruled that voluntary disclosure of an e-mail in a prior
proceeding had triggered the dreaded consequence of a subjectmatter waiver.216 There, in a separate unemployment benefits
matter,
the
defendant's
counsel
had
examined
the
plaintiff/employee at a hearing and produced an e-mail from
defendant's Human Resources Vice President to defendant's senior

Hill & Johnson, supra note 208, at n.43 & accompanying text.
See, e.g., FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992); Underwater
Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. at 549.
214 Hill & Johnson, supra note 208, at nn.34-35 & accompanying text. Cf In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding, in criminal
case, based on indication that client likely obstructed justice by deleting e-mails,
crime-fraud exception warranted compelling production of evidence of attorneyclient communication).
215 Note, though, that a recent decision in this area found e-mail messages
within a thread or string are severable for purposes of attorney-client privilege
analysis. See Premiere Digital Access, Inc. v. Cent. Tel. Co., 360 F. Supp. 2d
1168 (D. Nev. 2005) (vacating magistrate's decision and granting protective
order as to forwarded e-mail from in-house counsel).
216 Hollingsworth v. Time Warner, 812 N.E.2d 976 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004).
212
213
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counsel. The e-mail summarized why the employee had been
fired.2 17
In the subsequent discharge case, the same e-mail was
produced, purportedly involuntarily. 218 Claiming a subject-matter
waiver, the employee sought production of related documents.2 19
The trial court ordered the plaintiff to return the e-mail and denied
the plaintiffs motion to compel. The appellate court reversed,
finding abuse of discretion in ordering the return of a voluntarily
disclosed e-mail. 220 The trial court should have ordered the
supplemental production of the e-mails and other documents (e.g.,
deposition testimony) reflecting related communications with the
defendant's legal department.2 2'
Similarly, a few weeks earlier, an inadvertent production
argument failed to carry the day for a defendant in a securities
class action lawsuit in Massachusetts federal court.222 In that case,
a hardcopy of an e-mail to in-house counsel was in a redacted
document that had been produced in a group of eleven boxes of
documents. 223 Another e-mail had been redacted because that
e-mail was sent from a non-lawyer to the same in-house counsel.224
In the subsequent class action, the producing party, an
accounting firm, claimed that its disclosure of a manager's e-mail
to an in-house lawyer was inadvertent. 225 The court was not
persuaded by the fact that the attorneys were reviewing the
relevant documents two years after the original listing of the

217
218

See id. at 990.
d.

21 id.

220

Id. at 991-92.

See id.
See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 222 F.R.D. 29 (D. Mass. 2004)
(involving bankrupt software company's accounting tricks; disclosure deemed
"knowing," i.e., not inadvertent); see also VLT v. Lucent, 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
1319 (D. Mass. Jan. 21, 2003) (finding in massive patent litigation, stipulated
term "inadvertent" did not encompass "reckless" or "grossly-negligent" conduct;
"blame-the-paralegal" defense not wholly successful).
223 Lernout, 222 F.R.D. at 33.
22
4 d.
221

222

225

Id. at 32.
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pertinent e-mail on an SEC privilege log.22 6 It held that they were
still to be charged with knowing that the e-mail had been sent to an
in-house counsel. 227 A knowing or inadvertent disclosure of a
document protected by attorney-client privilege effects a waiver as
to other communications on the same subject. 228 Therefore, the
defendant had to produce related privileged e-mails.
An earlier decision had found limited waiver via voluntary, but
inadvertent, production of a second copy of an e-mail attached to
an "undeliverable" e-mail message from a system administrator.2 29
3. Stipulationsto Avoid Waiver Peril
A litigant can guard against a subsequent privilege waiver,
perhaps in conjunction with the Rule 26(f) conference, by entering
into a "quick peek" 23 o or "claw back" 231 stipulation with its
litigation opponent. It has become "[i]ncreasingly popular" for a
stipulation to have "explicit provisions as to how [it] . . . will deal

with documents inadvertently produced."2 32

226

Id. at 33.

See id.
See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 222 F.R.D. 29, 34-35 (D. Mass.
2004).
229 Murphy Oil USA v. Fluor Daniel, No. 2:99-CV-03564 (E.D.
La. Dec. 3,
2002) (granting motion to compel where two copies of same e-mail existed on
the defendant's backup tapes). Although it appears the crucial e-mail had been
produced in paper form, the e-mail metadata was implicitly central to the court's
analysis.
230 JUDGES, supra note 187, at 24 (stating that one can amend ten days from
awareness of mistake).
231 Id.
232 Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Formal Op. 2003-04, 2004 WL
837937 (N.Y.C. Assn. B. Comm. Prof. Jud. Eth. 2004) ("[U]seful ...
227
228

particularly ... where ... ethics rules and legal principles do not provide easy

answers in all circumstances.").
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4. New FRCP Clawback Process;ProposedFRE Waiver Rule
a. New FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) and 45(d)(2)(B) Amendments
The newly amended versions of FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) and
45(d)(2)(B) lay out a procedure to guard against inadvertent
privilege waivers.233 New Rule 26 states, in pertinent part:
If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making
the claim may notify any party that received the information of the
claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly
return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies
... and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is
resolved. A receiving party may promptly present the information to
the court under seal for a determination of the claim. 234

However, new Rule 26(b)(5)(B) is only procedural; it does "not
address the substantive questions whether privilege or work
product protection has been waived or forfeited. Instead, [it] sets
up a procedure to allow the responding party to assert a claim of
privilege or of work-product protection after production." 23 5 The
same goes for new Rule 45(d)(2)(B).23 6
In late 2005, a federal court decision essentially analyzed new
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) as if it were already in force. 237 That opinion
warned that the new Rule would present multiple traps for the
unwary: (1) unless incorporated into a scheduling order or
protective order, any non-waiver stipulations (of the claw back
variety) will be risky and not necessarily determinative of future
New Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B) aims to create a "procedure to allow
the
responding party to assert privilege after production." REPORT, supra note 41, at
Rules App. C-54-57. New Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B) is designed to be
"amended, as is Rule 26(b)(5), to add a procedure for [third-party subpoena
recipients'] assertion of privilege after inadvertent production of privileged
information." REPORT, supra note 41, at Rules App. C-104.
234 FRCP EDISCOVERY AMENDMENTS,
supra note 41, at 9-10.
235 REPORT, supra note 41, at
Rules App. C-54.
236 Id. at Rules App. C-91.
237 See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D.
Md. 2005); see also Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47853, at *34-35 & n.57 (D. Kan. Jul. 1, 2006) (ordering return of
electronic documents deemed inadvertently produced), adhered to on
reconsiderationby, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65485 (D. Kan. Sept. 13, 2006).
233
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disputes; 238 (2) as to the substance of a privilege or work-product
dispute, applicable state law principles will control (and privilege
standards differ from state to state); 239 (3) a given circuit court's
view on waiver may consist of the above "strict accountability"

approach; 240 and (4) "selective waiver" concerns. 24 1
b. Proposed New FRE 502
In May 2006, the Federal Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules entered the fray by publishing for comment a proposed new
Federal Rule of Evidence, namely FRE 502.242 In part, FRE 502
and its accompanying report and hearing transcript tackle the
concerns raised by the Hopson decision.243
New FRE 502(b) would preclude a waiver if two elements are
satisfied: first, if there were an inadvertent disclosure in discovery
in federal or state litigation or administrative proceedings; and
238

See id. at 239-40 ("[P]roduction . . . of... data must be at the compulsion

of the court, rather than solely by the voluntary act of the producing party[;] and
that the procedures agreed to by the parties and ordered by the court [must]
demonstrate that reasonable measures were taken to protect against waiver
See id. at 235, 244.
See id. at 235-37.
241 See id. at 235, n.10. The majority view is that
a selective waiver is not
valid, such that future litigants are not bound by a non-waiver agreement
reached with a government agency. See, e.g., McKesson HBOC v. Super. Ct., 9
Cal. Rptr. 3d 812 (Cal. App. I Dist. 2004.) There is a minority view upholding
selective waivers based on an old decision. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc); see also United States v. Bergonzi, 403
F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (discussing the open question in the
Ninth Circuit whether one can "disclose the results of an internal investigation to
an investigating government agency without waiving attorney client privilege or
work product protection as to the outside world"); see generally Jeremy Burns,
Selective Waiver in the Era of Privilege Uncertainty, 5 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 14
(2005). See also Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351 § 607(a)(b), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1785 (j)(l)-(2), 1828 (x)(l)-(2) (adopting selective waiver
doctrine as to disclosures to banking authorities and credit unions).
239

240

242 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES (May 15,

2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf [hereinafter FRE
REPORT].
243 See id.; ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVID. RULES: HEARING ON PROPOSAL

502, http://ddee.pf.com/PDFs/Rule502Hearing.pdf [hereinafter 502 HEARING
TRANSCRIPT] (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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second, if "the holder of the [attorney-client] privilege or work
product protection took reasonable precautions to prevent
disclosure and took reasonably prompt measures once it knew or
should have known of disclosure, to rectify the error," under
putative FRCP 26(b)(5)(B). 24
In terms of the spectrum of the three varying waiver standards,
proposed FRE 502(b) thus takes a "middle ground" approach.245 In
other words, it rejects the strict-liability approach, such that
inadvertent disclosure does not automatically affect a subject
matter waiver. In addition, proposed FRE 502(c) allows for
selective waiver as to the government.24 6
FRE 502(b) also attempts to make a federal court non-waiver
order (e.g., one establishing a claw-back) binding, even as to third
parties, not only in federal but also in state proceedings. The
Advisory Committee concedes that such a grant of extraterritorial
power would require Congress to enact the rule directly as a statute
under the Commerce Clause.24 7 Thus, a broad-sweeping rule
would likely face due process challenges.24 8 Only time will tell
how this jurisdictional issue will resolve itself.
5. Takeaways on Privilege
Absent a superseding strategy, try to stipulate to a protective
order early; namely, at the 26(f) conference. Heed the warnings of
Hopson and of proposed FRE 502 by making sure that all such
stipulations are court-endorsed. Note that while new FRCP
26(b)(5) took effect this December 1, the content of new FRE 502
is still being hashed out and cannot take effect until a year later.249
In addition, regarding lawyer-createdfiles, ethical guidelines
244
24 5

FRE REPORT at 6-7.
d. at 12.

24 6

See id. at 13.

247

Id. at 10.

1

See 502 HEARING TRANSCRIPT; see also Carol Eoannou, FRE Committee
To Consider Remedy for Privilege Problem Discussed in Hopson, DIGITAL
DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE 1 (Mar. 2006), http://www.pf.com/pdf/ddee
Sample.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
249 Jason Krause, Panel Provides Plug For Privilege Hole; New Federal Rule
Could Provide Way To Protect Claw-Back Documents (May 5, 2006),
http://www.abanet.org/joumal/redesign/my5evidence.html.
248
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and/or decisional law have little, if any, practical effect. Once
privileged matter has been disclosed to an opponent, the recipient
will not be able to erase it from his or her memory. One cannot
un-ring the bell.250 Therefore, as to lawyer-created files, one
prophylactic measure can and should be taken by practitioners in
both the transactional and litigation settings: 251 counsel should run
metadata-scrubbing software 25 2 on any electronic files before
disseminating such files via e-mail or portable media or filetransfer-protocol (ftp). 2 53

See generally David J. Stanoch, Comment, Finders ... Weepers?:
Clarifying a Pennsylvania's Lawyer's Obligations to Return Inadvertent
Disclosures,Even After a New ABA Rule 4.4(b), 75 TEMPLE L. REv. 657 (2002).
See also Thomas E. Spahn, Litigation Ethics in the Modern Age, 33 THE BRIEF
13, 13, 16, n.38, available at http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/
publications/commercial litigation/LitigationEthics.Brief.33.2.Winter2004.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2006). For further information, see supra notes 34 and 38
and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., Helen Leah Conroy, Cal. Bus. Law Practitioner, Ten Ways Email Can Sabotage Your Deal (Winter 2004), http://www.helenconroylaw.
com/index.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
252 See, e.g., Workshare Protect:
Content Filtering, Software to Remove
Metadata,
http://www.workshare.com/products/wsprotect/default.aspx
(last
visited Nov. 9, 2006).
253 FTP is the protocol for exchanging files between computers over the
Internet. See Webopedia Computer Dictionary, http://www.pcwebopedia.com/
TERM/F/FTP.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
250
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IV. CONCLUSION-THE FUTURE?
It is only a matter of time before voicemail messages and
instant messaging (IM) logs become part of the eDiscovery mix as
well.254 Unified messaging-whereby each voicemail ends up as
an attachment to an e-mail message received in one's e-mail
Inbox-will likely be one catalyst. Individual, as opposed to
entity, plaintiffs will probably be another. At some point, such
individual plaintiffs, undaunted by mutually-assured-destruction
reciprocal requests from entity defendants, will push the envelope.
Beware these next waves.

See Mary Mack, Voice Mail Discovery: Look Who's Talking, EDISCOVERY ADVISOR (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.fiosinc.com/resources/
pdfFiles/200603_talking.pdf; Bethany Cunningham Gabbert, Esq. & Jason
Beware of Instant Messaging, EDISCOVERY
Derting, Law Technology:
ADVISOR, http://e-discoveryadvisor.com/doc/1 7968 (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
254

